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INTRODUCTIONS TARE decisis is an integral, accepted principle of American and
common-law jurisprudence. The idea that courts should follow past
decisions, whether of the same or a higher court, was accepted before this
nation was born' and continues to be generally accepted today. Criticism
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1. Blackstone wrote: "The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and
rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their reason be not
obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to suppose that
they acted wholly without consideration." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 070.
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of stare decisis is equally ancient, however.2 A countervailing tradition
allows a court to overrule precedent to correct its errors and develop the
law. "The life of the law has not been logic," Holmes wrote; "it has been
experience." 3 Stare decisis has never been an inexorable command in the
American system; courts have always been willing to overrule under the
proper circumstances. The United States Supreme Court in particular
has never held an absolute view of the validity of its own prior decisions.4
This willingness to overrule has created a problem for inferior courts,
for even stronger than the tradition that a court should follow its own
prior decisions is the tradition that a court should follow the prior deci-
sions of a superior court in the same appellate system.5 The Supreme
Court's willingness to change doctrine creates situations in which a lower
court cannot be completely loyal to the Supreme Court: a Supreme
Court precedent directly applies to the case at hand, but later Supreme
Court cases cast doubt on that precedent, either rejecting its analysis or
applying a different test to an analogous issue. If the lower court is con-
vinced that the Supreme Court would no longer follow the doubtful pre-
cedent, must the lower court nevertheless pay heed to stare decisis and
apply that precedent? Or should it be faithful to the later decisions and
rule as it believes the Supreme Court, given the opportunity, now would?
Two competing lines of decision arose in the lower federal courts. One
line of cases, apparently a minority view, held that lower courts must
blindly and absolutely follow Supreme Court decisions until the Supreme
Court expressly overrules them. According to this view, lower courts
owe allegiance to earlier Supreme Court precedent, regardless of how
doubtful that precedent may have become in light of Supreme Court de-
velopments in other areas. The majority view rejected this wooden appli-
2. Jonathan Swift wrote:
It is a maxim among ... lawyers, that whatever hath been done before may
legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the
decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of man-
kind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to jus-
tify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of decreeing
accordingly.
J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels 201 (L. Landa ed. 1960). In The Merchant of Venice, Portia
criticized precedent thus:
It must not be, there is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established.
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state.
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc. 1 (1596-97).
3. O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), Lecture I.
4. See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1361 (1988).
5. See Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication,
73 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 402 n.6 (1988); Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower
Courts, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 3, 4 (1967); see also Note, Anticipatory Stare Decisis, 8 U. Kan.
L. Rev. 165, 167 (1959) (discussing circumstances in which a lower court may be justified
in departing from precedent established by a higher court).
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cation of stare decisis, arguing that lower courts should recognize when a
Supreme Court precedent is effectively dead, whether or not the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the murder. According to this view, lower
courts should disregard Supreme Court decisions when they are reason-
ably sure6 that the Supreme Court would overrule them given the oppor-
tunity. This rejection of doubtful precedent by lower courts has been
termed anticipatory overruling.7
Over the years, the Supreme Court reviewed lower court decisions tak-
ing both positions but not until 1989 did the Court express a clear opin-
ion on the validity of anticipatory overruling. Whether the lower court
blindly followed a doubtful precedent that the Supreme Court later re-
versed, rejected a precedent that the Supreme Court later reaffirmed, or
reached a decision with which the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, the
Court was silent on the question of anticipatory overruling.
In the 1989 case Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,' the Court finally spoke in favor of blind obedience to precedent.
Rodriguez involved a conflict between two Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning arbitration of federal securities claims. In 1953, in Wilko v.
Swan,9 the Supreme Court held that predispute agreements to arbitrate
claims arising under the Securities Act of 193310 violated that Act's anti-
waiver provisions and were thus unenforceable. For over twenty years,
most courts assumed that the Wilko ruling also applied to claims arising
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Courts reasoned that the
two statutes have virtually identical antiwaiver provisions and are inter-
preted as interrelated, interdependent components of a single regulatory
scheme.12 However, in 1987, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon, 3 the Supreme Court rejected much of Wilko's reasoning and
held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the
1934 Act are enforceable. The McMahon majority refused to overrule
Wilko and expressly reserved the 1933 Act issue. 4
6. As discussed below, the level of certainty required varied from court to court. See
infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
7. See Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedentsr Anticipatory Action by United
States Courts of Appeals, 51 Fordhan L. Rev. 53, 53 (1982).
8. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989).
10. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1988).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1988).
12. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Court
noted that
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated components of the federal regu-
latory scheme governing transactions in securities. As the Court indicated in
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 'the interdependence of the various sections of
the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the lan-
guage Congress has chosen.'
Id. at 206 (citations omitted).
13. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
14. See id. at 234.
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McMahon left the lower courts in a quandary. The Supreme Court
had rejected Wilko's rationale, thereby casting its holding into doubt, but
had not expressly overruled the case. Should the lower courts follow
Wilko or not? The resulting decisions reflected the doctrinal split con-
cerning anticipatory overruling. Approximately half of the subsequent
decisions followed Wilko. 5 The other half held that Wilko could not
survive McMahon and rejected Wilko even though the Supreme Court
had expressly refused to overrule it. 6
In Rodriguez, the court expressly overruled Wilko and extended the
McMahon holding to 1933 Act claims, in effect confirming the prediction
of those courts that viewed McMahon as overruling Wilko. Both the
majority and the dissent in Rodriguez, however, lashed out at the lower
courts for what the Justices saw as a premature rejection of Wilko. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, lower courts owe absolute allegiance to
Supreme Court opinions, doubtful or not, until the Supreme Court ex-
pressly overrules them. "If a precedent of this Court has direct applica-
tion in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions," the Rodriguez majority wrote, "the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the preroga-
tive of overruling its own decisions." 7 With no further discussion of the
issue, the Supreme Court rejected anticipatory overruling.
A Supreme Court position on this jurisprudential question was over-
due. Unfortunately, the Court chose the wrong position. By focusing so
narrowly on an inflexible rule of stare decisis, the Court overlooked the
very policies that stare decisis is meant to serve. Anticipatory overruling
makes the law more responsive to change, it ensures litigants fair and
equal treatment, it enhances the predictability of the law and it promotes
judicial efficiency.18 Instead of condemning the lower courts that refused
to follow Wilko, the Supreme Court should have applauded them.
15. See, e.g., Sacco v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (applying Wilko, district court held arbitration agreement unenforceable with re-
spect to claims alleging misrepresentation under Securities Act of 1933); Araim v.
Painewebber, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that Wilko was still
good law, court held claims under Securities Act not subject to mandatory arbitration);
McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 86-2752-2758 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18,
1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL 23008) (claims brought under section 12(2) of 1933 Act
not arbitrable); Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1092,
1095 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (following Wilko, arbitration could not be compelled).
16. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding that McMahon evidenced the demise of Wilko, court held agree-
ments to arbitrate Securities Act claims enforceable), aff'd, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Schuster
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); Kavouras v.
Visual Prods. Sys., 680 F. Supp. 205, 207 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same); Staiman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
17. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921-
22 (1989).
18. See infra Part V.
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I. ANTICIPATORY OVERRULING PRIOR TO RODRIGUEZ
The doctrine of anticipatory overruling rejected in Rodriguez was in no
sense revolutionary. Anticipatory overruling has been vigorously de-
bated in the lower courts for some time. Prior to Rodriguez, a number of
lower court opinions indicated, often in dictum, a willingness to disre-
gard a Supreme Court precedent if convinced that the Supreme Court
would not follow it.' 9 The few scholars writing on the issue generally
agreed. 20
Another line of cases stated that lower courts must follow Supreme
Court precedent, doubtful or not, until it had been expressly overruled. 2'
19. See Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989); Levine v. Heifer-
nan, 864 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 204 (1989); Colby v. J.C.
Penney Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987); Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986); Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Ameri-
can Airlines, 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City
of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1983); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899,
904 (7th Cir. 1982); Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 984
(1976); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 39 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub noma. United States v.
Korman, 406 U.S. 952 (1972); Breakefield v. District of Columbia, 442 F.2d 1227, 1230
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971); Salerno v. American League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001
(1971); Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968);
Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated sub nom.
Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Perkins v. Endicott Johnson
Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Healy v. Edwards,
363 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 (E.D. La. 1973), vacated, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Fishkin v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 278 (1970); Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Bd.,
298 F. Supp. 339, 350 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 511 (C.D.
Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520 (1965); Barnette v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp.
251, 252-53 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Mason v. United States, 461
F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); see also United States v.
Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J. in support of
rehearing en banc) (lower court should predict how the Supreme Court would rule and
not depend solely on Court's failure to expressly overrule precedent), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 765 (1st Cir. 1945) (Wood-
bury, J., dissenting) (stare decisis does not require lower courts to blindly follow higher
courts), rev'd, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
20. See Kelman, supra note 5, at 26; Kniffin, supra note 7, at 87-89; Note, supra note
5, at 168; Comment, Stare Decisis and the Lower Courts Two Recent Cases, 59 Colum. L
Rev. 504, 508 (1959); Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 89 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Predict-
ing the Demise]; Comment, The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents, 50 Yale
L.J. 1448, 1457 (1941).
21. See Caldwell, 543 F.2d at 1369-70; Northern Virginia Regional Park Auth. v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346, 1350-1351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 936 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 436
(1970); Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902
(1965); United States v. Chase, 281 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1960); Lichter Found., Inc. v.
Welch, 269 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir. 1959); Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 621
(4th Cir. 1957); United States v. Ullman, 221 F.2d 760, 762 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350
U.S. 422 (1956); Sears v. Hassett, 111 F.2d 961, 964-65 (1st Cir. 1940); Quilici v. Village
of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1181 (N.D. I11. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1990]
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The strongest defense of this absolute position was written by Justice
Blackmun when he was on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In re-
fusing to disregard two ten-year-old Supreme Court double jeopardy
cases, he wrote:
This court is not the Supreme Court of the United States. We there-
fore are not free to disregard an existing fiat and still live holding of the
Supreme Court even though that holding is one by a sharply divided
tribunal and even though only one of the Justices who participated in
the majority decision remains active. A change in constitutional con-
cept and the overruling of an existing decision, if indicated at all, is for
the Supreme Court and is not for us. Firmness of precedent otherwise
could not exist. Further, we deal here with no mere implication or
interpretation of language. We are confronted with a specific
holding.22
Not every statement of the rigid rule of stare decisis was absolute, how-
ever. Some of the cases hedged enough to allow the court to depart from
that rule in appropriate circumstances.23 In many other cases that stated
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885,
901 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961); United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp.
838, 840 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 505 (1961);
Family Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62, 68-69 (E.D.S.C. 1948), rev'd, 336 U.S.
220 (1949).
Chase is representative of courts adhering to a strict rule of stare decisis. In Chase, the
court of appeals was asked to reject the Supreme Court's holding in Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). Judge Duffy wrote for the court:
The Rogers case was a five to three decision. It has been frequently criticized.
It is extremely doubtful that the holding in Rogers would be followed by the
present Supreme Court. Nevertheless, if the Rogers decision is applicable to the
situation before us, we must follow that decision, at least until such time as the
Supreme Court may overrule it.
Chase, 281 F.2d at 230. Although that absolute view has been rejected by more recent
Seventh Circuit cases, it has at least survived on that court in a relatively recent concur-
rence. See Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 909 (Cudahy, J., concurring). In Nor-
ris, Judge Cudahy wrote:
The majority urges that we seek out the living law and not be content with the
dead. Ante at 904. I would be the last to denigrate this unexceptionable aspira-
tion, but somehow I do not recognize it in the form discerned by the majority.
We are not here to predict, even when there is controlling Supreme Court pre-
cedent, 'how the Supreme Court will decide particular issues when presented to
it for decision.' Ante at 904. (This is not a case in which there is no Supreme
Court precedent on point, but one in which the determinative question has been
definitively answered by the Court fairly recently.) Somehow stare decisis has
come a cropper if we are to seriously pursue the majority's approach. Any hope
of certainty must be abandoned if the majority has its way, More than the
inclinations of a majority of the Supreme Court, or of a panel of the court of
appeals, must shift before a controlling precedent can be declared defunct.
Id.
22. Ashe, 399 F.2d at 45.
23. For example, in United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976), a panel of the D.C. Circuit wrote that "[o]ur duty is to
abide Leland as long as the Supreme Court has not made its demise plain." Id. at 1370
(emphasis added). The court apparently accepted the appellants' argument that the
Supreme Court case could be rejected if it had been overruled sub silentio. See id; see also
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an absolute rule of stare decisis, the court had no reason to doubt the
applicable Supreme Court precedent. 24
Even courts supporting anticipatory overruling disagreed about when
it was appropriate. Most courts required a strong showing that the
Supreme Court was likely to overrule before they would disregard live
Supreme Court precedent. The actual phrasing of the standard varied
from "near certainty" to "strong evidence." '25 Some courts, however,
Blalock, 247 F.2d at 621 ("Rarely would a Court of Appeals be justified in declaring
devitalized and no longer to be followed a Supreme Court decision passing directly on the
precise point at issue, because of another decision of the Supreme Court in a related,
though different area.") (emphasis added); Ullman, 221 F.2d at 762 ("an inferior court
like ours may not modify a Supreme Court doctrine in the absence of any indication of
new doctrinal trends in that Court's opinions") (emphasis added).
24. For example, a panel of the Sixth Circuit stated in 1959: "The Court of Appeals
is required to follow the existing rulings of the Supreme Court instead of forecasting that
the ruling will be changed when the matter is again considered by the Court." Welch,
269 F.2d at 145. However, the court in that case was presented with no evidence that the
Supreme Court might have changed its mind, just an argument that the Supreme Court
decision at issue was unsound. Cases like this are more appropriately read as reaffirming
the general principle of stare decisis. See, e.g., Sears, 111 F.2d at 964-65 (prior Supreme
Court precedent distinguished on facts in later cases but never "disapproved"); Quilici,
532 F. Supp. at 1181-83 (prior Supreme Court precedent was "still good law"); Swift, 189
F. Supp. at 901 (same).
25. Some courts said they would disregard a Supreme Court precedent only if subse-
quent events created a "near certainty" that the Supreme Court would overrule it if given
the chance. See Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th
Cir. 1986); Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976);
Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). Other courts required that later decisions indi-
cate to a "high degree of probability" that the Supreme Court would repudiate the earlier
precedent. See Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 204 (1989); see also Norris, 687 F.2d at 904 (anticipatory overruling appropriate
only where "later decisions.., indicate that the Court very probably will not decide the
issue the same way the next time."). Other courts said that they would disregard a
Supreme Court precedent only if "convinced" or "powerfully convinced" that the
Supreme Court would overrule. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123
(7th Cir. 1987) ("powerfully convinced"); Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Air-
lines, 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984) ("convinced"); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 39
(7th Cir. 1971) ("convinced"), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Korman, 406 U.S. 952
(1972). A variety of other standards have been articulated. See, eg., Miller v. United
States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989) ("strong evidence"); Minority Police Officers
Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); Breakefield v.
District of Columbia, 442 F.2d 1227, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("very clear"), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 909 (1971); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 ( E.D. La. 1973) ("obvi-
ously"), vacated, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309
F. Supp. 40, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ("apparent"), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970);
Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339,
350 (W.D. Wis. 1969) ("clearly eroded").
Judge Richard Posner has written on anticipatory overruling more often than any
other judge: he has discussed the issue in at least five cases. See Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123;
Olson, 806 F.2d at 734; Indianapolis Airport Auth., 733 F.2d at 1272; City of South Bend,
721 F.2d at 200-201; Norris, 687 F.2d at 902-904. He was also a member of a panel
issuing a per curiam opinion in another case. See Miller, 868 F.2d at 241. His various
statements of the rule indicate the difficulty of defining a standard. In his first approach
to the subject, Judge Posner posed the issue as one of predicting how the Supreme Court
1990]
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seemed willing to overrule on a mere preponderance standard-was it
more likely than not that the Supreme Court would overrule?26 These
latter opinions viewed the lower court's function as merely predicting
what the Supreme Court would do. Unlike other standards employed by
the lower courts, the predictive standard accords precedent no presump-
tion of validity. The lower court takes the best evidence available and
predicts what the Supreme Court would do, with no artificial presump-
tion in favor of following the questionable precedent.
The cases in which lower courts actually disregarded Supreme Court
precedent, as opposed to merely stating a willingness to do so, are fewer
in number.2" In fact, it is safe to say that the post-McMahon cases re-
jecting Wilko more than doubled the number of lower court cases di-
rectly rejecting Supreme Court precedent that had not been expressly
overruled.28 Seen as the Rodriguez majority would view them, the post-
will decide a particular issue when it is presented for decision. Ordinarily the best predic-
tor is past precedent,
[b]ut sometimes later decisions, though not explicitly overruling or even men-
tioning an earlier decision, indicate that the Court very probably will not decide
the issue the same way the next time. In such a case, to continue to follow the
earlier case blindly until it is formally overruled is to apply the dead, not the
living, law.
Norris, 687 F.2d at 904. Judge Posner later wrote that a lower court may reject a
Supreme Court precedent only when faced with "strong evidence" that the Supreme
Court would overrule if it had the opportunity. See Miller, 868 F.2d at 241 (per curiam);
City of South Bend, 721 F.2d at 201. He later wrote that the court had to be "convinced"
that the Supreme Court would overrule. See Indianapolis Airport Auth., 733 F.2d at 1272
(dictum). Later still, he limited anticipatory overruling to cases where "the lower court is
certain or almost certain that the decision or doctrine would be rejected by the higher
court if a case presenting the issue came before it." Olson, 806 F.2d at 741. According to
Judge Posner, "[t]his is a high standard and will rarely be met." Id. His most recent
pronouncement requires the lower court to be "powerfully convinced" that the Supreme
Court would overrule if given the chance. See Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123 (dictum).
26. The opinions in an oft-cited Second Circuit case, Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh,
139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated sub nom. Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101 (1944), illustrate this position. Writing for the majority, Judge Clark stated that
the court's job was to "determine with the best exercise of our mental powers of which we
are capable that law which in all probability will be applied to these litigants or to others
similarly situated." Id. at 814. Judge Learned Hand dissented, but accepted this "pre-
dictive" function of the lower courts. The measure of the lower court's duty, according
to Judge Hand, "is to divine, as best it can, what would be the event of an appeal in the
case before it." Id. at 823 (L. Hand, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C.
Circuit repeated this standard years later in a dissenting opinion. See United States v.
Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J. in support of
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
27. See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904; Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 441 F.2d
1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 320 (1972); Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709,
714 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1117
(E.D. La. 1973), vacated, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 511
(C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 819-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520 (1965); Barnette v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 47
F. Supp. 251, 252-53 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. This development is even more striking considering that only two years passed
between the Supreme Court's decisions in McMahon and Rodriguez.
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McMahon cases rejecting Wilko presented the greatest challenge to stare
decisis in the history of American jurisprudence.
Barnette v. West Virginia Board of Education,29 decided in 1942, is the
most frequently cited example of anticipatory overruling. Barnette in-
volved a constitutional challenge to a compulsory flag salute in public
schools. The Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of such a
flag salute in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,3" which, at the time
Barnette was decided, had not been overruled. Judge Parker's rejection
of Gobitis has become classic:
Ordinarily we would feel constrained to follow an unreversed decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether we agreed with it
or not. It is true that decisions are but evidences of the law and not the
law itself; but the decisions of the Supreme Court must be accepted by
the lower courts as binding upon them if any orderly administration of
justice is to be attained. The developments with respect to the Gobitis
case, however, are such that we do not feel that it is incumbent upon us
to accept it as binding authority. Of the seven justices nowy members of
the Supreme Court who participated in that decision, four have given
public expression to the view that it is unsound, the present Chief Jus-
tice in his dissenting opinion rendered therein and three other justices
in a special dissenting opinion in Jones v. City of Opelika. The major-
ity of the court in Jones v. City of Opelika, moreover, thought it worth
while to distinguish the decision in the Gobitis case, instead of relying
upon it as supporting authority. Under such circumstances and believ-
ing, as we do, that the flag salute here required is violative of religious
liberty when required of persons holding the religious views of plain-
tiffs, we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if through
a blind following of a decision which the Supreme Court itself has thus
impaired as an authority, we should deny protection to rights which
we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by constitu-
tional guaranties.3!
A more striking example is Harris v. Younger,32 where the district
court rejected an earlier Supreme Court decision upholding the very stat-
ute being challenged. In 1927, the Supreme Court specifically upheld the
constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act in Whitney v.
California.33 Harris v. Younger was a 1968 constitutional challenge to
that same statute. The district court noted that statutes implicating first
amendment concerns had been held to a higher level of scrutiny since
Whitney. The court concluded that Whitney was no longer binding, even
though it had never been expressly overruled.34 The district court obvi-
ously predicted correctly: the Supreme Court overruled Whitney the
29. 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943).
31. Barnette v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. at 252-53 (citation omitted).
32. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
33. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
34. See Harris, 281 F. Supp. at 511-16.
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year after the district court's decision.35
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS
Rodriguez's strong rejection of anticipatory overruling was surprising.
Supreme Court decisions prior to Rodriguez said very little about how
the lower courts should treat doubtful Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court had many opportunities to criticize anticipatory overrul-
ing, but did not do so.
In most cases in which a lower court rejected suspect Supreme Court
precedent, the Supreme Court simply ignored the jurisprudential issue
and confined its opinion to the substantive issue at hand.36 The Court
did so even when a majority or plurality held that the lower court's rejec-
tion of precedent was substantively incorrect. 37 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has refused to criticize lower courts for blindly following prece-
35. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed the
district court in Harris on procedural grounds. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1973) (brushing aside the
stare decisis issue, Court reversed on basis of substantive law of trusts), rev'g 461 F.2d
1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1972)
(basing decision on petitioner's failure to exhaust remedies), aff'g 441 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (without raising stare decisis
concerns, Court reversed on basis of lower court's misinterpretation and erroneous retro-
active application of precedent), rev'g 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969); Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54, 57-58, 65-67 (1968) (upholding lower court's decision on the merits based on
subsequent development of writ of habeas corpus), aff'g 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (distinguishing facts rather than
asserting stare decisis), rev'g 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (ignoring district court's anticipatory overruling and
holding that compulsory flag salute is unconstitutional), aff'g 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W.
Va. 1942).
37. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986). In Bowers, the court of
appeals struck down a Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, holding that it
violated a constitutional right of privacy. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The court of appeals refused to follow an
earlier Supreme Court summary affirmance upholding a similar Virginia statute. See Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). The court of appeals recognized that a summary aflirmance
was binding precedent, but held that later Supreme Court privacy cases had undermined
it. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1207-13. Even though the earlier Supreme
Court decision had not been overruled, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was free to
reach its own decision on the merits: "Doctrinal developments need not take the form of
an outright reversal of the earlier case. The Supreme Court may indicate its willingness
to reverse or reconsider a prior opinion with such clarity that a lower court may properly
refuse to follow what appears to be binding precedent." Id. at 1209. The petitioner di-
rectly challenged this jurisprudential ruling in the Supreme Court, but the Court chose
not to address it:
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Dis-
trict Court was not obligated to follow our summary affirmance in Doe. We
need not resolve this dispute, for we prefer to give plenary consideration to the
merits of this case rather than rely on our earlier action in Doe.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189 n.4. None of the opinions in the case discusses this
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dents that the Court itself overruled.3"
Occasional language in Supreme Court opinions can be read as sup-
porting or criticizing anticipatory overruling, but such language is usu-
ally limited by its context. The most direct statement consistent with
Rodriguez appeared in Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand,
Ltd. ," which involved an issue of federal-question jurisdiction. In Thur-
ston Motor Lines, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Rice,"° an earlier Supreme Court case, expressing in
dictum its "doubt that Rice [was] still good law."'" The Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Rice and went on to
note that, "[n]eedless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its
precedents. Until that occurs, Rice is the law."42
In Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners,3 Justice Powell wrote an
opinion which also seemed to require blind adherence to Supreme Court
precedent until overruled. In granting an application for a stay of a dis-
trict court ruling in a school prayer case, he wrote:
issue. Instead, the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the constitu-
tional right of privacy on the merits.
United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973), is similar. In West v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1948), the Supreme Court had held that Oklahoma could
levy its estate tax on certain trust property of restricted Osage Indians. In 1972, adminis-
trators of an Osage Indian's estate claimed that the federal government had breached its
fiduciary duty by paying the Oklahoma estate tax without challenge. See Mason, 412
U.S. at 394. The U.S. Court of Claims agreed, holding that an intervening Supreme
Court case had undercut the foundations of the West opinion and that the Supreme Court
would no longer follow West. See Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (Ct.
Cl. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 391 (1973). The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the
West issue. See Mason, 412 U.S. at 400. The Supreme Court held that, whether or not
West should be overruled, the United States did not breach a fiduciary duty by failing to
anticipate that it would be overruled. See id at 397. Justice Marshall's majority decision
expressed reserved support for the continuing vitality of West: "Although it might be fair
to say that over the years the fringes of the West doctrine have been worn away, its core
holding remains unimpeached by any decisions of this or any other court." Id. In spite
of its defense of West, however, the Supreme Court said nothing about the Court of
Claims' willingness to disregard this "unimpeached" precedent. See also White, 401 U.S.
at 747 (ignoring the anticipatory overruling issue); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (same).
38. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), rev'g 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968);
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), rev'g 149 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1945). Ashe v.
Swenson is particularly interesting. In describing the district court and court of appeals
opinions, the Supreme Court quoted language from each opinion refusing to forecast
whether the Supreme Court would reverse, but the Supreme Court did not comment on
these excerpts. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 440 n.4, 441 n.5.
39. 460 U.S. 533 (1983), rev'g 682 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. 247 U.S. 201 (1918). In Rice, the Court held that a suit by a carrier to recover
money for the interstate shipment of livestock under tariffs regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Act presented a federal question. See id. at 203.
41. Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 682 F.2d 811, 813-14 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 460 U.S. 533 (1983). The court of appeals stated that the term "arising
under" federal law had taken on a narrower meaning since Rice, although it cited no later
cases questioning Rice. See id.
42. Thurston Motor Lines, 460 U.S. at 535.
43. 459 U.S. 1314 (1983).
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Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obli-
gated to follow them. Similarly, my own authority as Circuit Justice is
limited by controlling decisions of the full Court.44
This opinion, however, must be considered in context. The district court
did not conclude that the existing Supreme Court precedent's application
to the particular case was uncertain or that the Supreme Court was likely
to overrule. The district court concluded that "the United States
Supreme Court has erred,"' 45 and directly overruled clearly applicable,
unquestioned Supreme Court precedent. Read in context, Justice Pow-
ell's opinion is more a general defense of stare decisis than a rejection of
anticipatory overruling.
A similar limitation applies to certain language in Hicks v. Miranda.4 6
Hicks involved the constitutionality of a California obscenity statute.
Although the Supreme Court had summarily dismissed an appeal of a
prior case that found the same statute constitutional, the district court in
Hicks concluded that the summary disposition did not have "plenary
precedential value."4 7 The Supreme Court, however, held that the sum-
mary disposition was a decision on the merits with full precedential ef-
fect, and concluded with an admonishment to the lower court:
The District Court should have followed the Second Circuit's advice,
first, in Port Authority Bondholders Protective Committee v. Port of New
York Authority, that 'unless and until the Supreme Court should in-
struct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view
that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so
except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise'; and, later, in
Doe v. Hodgson, that the lower courts are bound by summary decisions
by this Court 'until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they]
are not.'
48
This statement, like Justice Powell's opinion in Jaffree, is limited by con-
text-the Supreme Court responded to the lower court's refusal to follow
what the Court believed was valid, unquestioned precedent. In addition,
the Court recognized that a lower court might refuse to follow a sum-
mary disposition " 'when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.'" 4 9
44. Id. at 1316.
45. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 926 (1984).
46. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
47. See Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 364 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 332
(1975).
48. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protec-
tive Comm. v. Port of New York Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 436 (1968) and Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973) (quoting Fein v. Deegan, 410 F.2d 13, 22 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969))).
49. Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
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This suggests that a precedent that has not been overruled may be disre-
garded when later doctrinal developments render it suspect.
At least two Supreme Court cases provide tenuous support for the idea
that lower courts may reject doubtful precedent. In Skrupa v. Sanborn,'
a three-judge district court struck down a Kansas statute prohibiting
"debt adjusting" except as incident to the practice of law. The district
court relied on a state-court case adopting the philosophy of Adams v.
Tanner,51 which held that the due process clause prevented a state from
prohibiting a business that was "useful" and not "inherently immoral or
dangerous to public welfare."52 The Supreme Court pointed out that Ad-
ams v. Tanner, although never directly overruled, was a Lochner-era de-
cision and that
reliance on Adams v. Tanner is as mistaken as would be adherence to
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish. Not only has the philosophy of Adams been abandoned, but
also this Court almost 15 years ago expressly pointed to another opin-
ion of this Court as having 'clearly undermined' Adams.53
Thus, at least in some cases, the Court expects lower courts to reject
doubtful precedent even if that precedent has not been directly overruled.
Peyton v. Rowe54 also provides arguable support for anticipatory over-
ruling. Peyton was a constitutional challenge by writ of habeas corpus to
state criminal sentences that ran consecutively with earlier sentences and
thus would not be served until sometime in the future. At issue was the
Supreme Court's 1934 holding in McNally v. Hill55 that the writ of
habeas corpus was unavailable to challenge a sentence to be served in the
future. The court of appeals refused to follow McNally, arguing that it
was no longer valid:
Since McNally v. Hill the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with
the problem, but it has embraced a more liberal, less technical concept
of the writ.... The new approach is thoroughly inconsistent with the
narrowly technical one of McNally.5
6
In affirming, the Supreme Court expressly approved the reasoning of the
court of appeals:
Recognizing that the District Courts had correctly applied McNally,
the Court of Appeals declined to adhere to that decision. Writing for a
unanimous court, Chief Judge Haynsworth reasoned that this Court
would no longer follow McNally, which in his view represented a 'doc-
50. 210 F. Supp. 200 (D. Kan. 1961), rev'd sub nom., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
51. 244 U.S. 590 (1917), overruled, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 731.
52. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. at 593. In Tanner, the Court found that a Washing-
ton state law forbidding the running of an employee agency violated the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. See id. at 596-97.
53. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 731 (citations omitted).
54. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
55. 293 U.S. 131 (1934), overruled, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. at 67.
56. Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
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trinaire approach' based on an 'old jurisdictional concept' which had
been 'thoroughly rejected by the Supreme Court in recent cases.' We
are in complete agreement with this conclusion and the considerations
underlying it.5
7
This last sentence probably expresses no more than the Supreme Court's
agreement that McNally should be overruled. However, the Court's ap-
proval of the "considerations underlying" the lower court's opinion
could be read as agreeing that a lower court may disregard doubtful, but
still live, precedent. The quoted passage certainly indicates no hostility
to the lower court's action.
Some of the Supreme Court's opinions evidence an almost schizo-
phrenic attitude towards anticipatory overruling. Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Desist v. United States5" is illustrative. Justice Harlan focused on
the effect, for habeas corpus purposes, of constitutional precedent that
was questionable at the time of conviction and subsequently overruled.
He first wrote that "the lower courts cannot be faulted when, following
the doctrine of stare decisis, they apply the rules which have been author-
itatively announced by this Court. If anyone is responsible for changing
these rules, it is this Court."59 On the next page, however, Justice
Harlan apparently recognized the legitimacy of anticipatory overruling:
It is hard to believe that any lawyer worthy of the name could, after
reading Silverman, rely with confidence on the continuing vitality of
the Goldman rule. Nor is it by any means clear to me that it would
have been improper for a lower court to have declined to follow
Goldman in the light of Silverman.60
Thus, at worst, the Court's earlier pronouncements affecting anticipatory
overruling were inconsistent. At best, some of them could actually be
read as approving anticipatory overruling.
III. THE HISTORY BEHIND RODRIGUEZ: SECURITIES ARBITRATION
AND THE SUPREME COURT
As shown above, the Supreme Court's rejection of anticipatory over-
ruling in Rodriguez was certainly not required, or even foreshadowed, by
earlier rulings. Rodriguez rejected without discussion a long tradition of
anticipatory overruling in the lower courts despite a tacit toleration of
those decisions by the Supreme Court. A full understanding of the
Supreme Court's statements in Rodriguez first requires a review of the
Court's prior rulings on securities arbitration. Only with that back-
ground can one appreciate the dilemma lower courts faced after McMa-
hon and the magnitude of the Supreme Court's rejection of anticipatory
57. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. at 57-58 (citation omitted).
58. 394 U.S. 244, 255-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 264 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 265 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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overruling in Rodriguez.61
A. Wilko v. Swan
Wilko v. Swan62 was the first Supreme Court case dealing with the
arbitrability of federal securities claims. The petitioner alleged that his
brokerage firm violated section 12(2) of the 1933 Act63 by fraudulently
inducing him to purchase stock. The petitioner had signed an agreement
with the broker agreeing to arbitrate all disputes with the firm, but con-
tended that section 14 of the 1933 Act, the anti-waiver provision, ren-
dered the agreement unenforceable." Section 14 provides that "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any se-
curity to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 65 The 1933
Act gives injured plaintiffs a right to sue,6 6 and pre-dispute arbitration
agreements waive that right; the Wilko Court therefore reasoned that
section 14 voids predispute arbitration agreements. According to Justice
Reed, judicial direction is necessary to "fairly assure [the] effective-
ness" 67 of the 1933 Act's protections. Even though the Act's liability
provisions would apply in arbitration, they would be less effective there:
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of
an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but
applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As
their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' con-
ception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 'burden
61. The Rodriguez rejection of anticipatory overruling was also a bad policy decision.
See infra Part V.
62. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
63. Section 12(2) provides that any person who
offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section
77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communi-
cation, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchas-
ing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
64. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432-33.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988).
67. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact'. . . cannot be examined.
Power to vacate an award is limited .... In unrestricted submissions,
such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation. 68
Justice Frankfurter wrote a brief dissent, joined by Justice Minton, re-
jecting the argument that arbitration would jeopardize the plaintiff's
rights.69 Justice Frankfurter found nothing in the record to support that
conclusion and also argued that judicial review could adequately insure
that arbitrators followed the law.
B. The Intervening Years-Avoiding the Issue
In the 1974 case Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,70 the Supreme Court
had its first opportunity to apply Wilko to 1934 Act claims, but the ma-
jority refused to do so. Scherk involved an international transaction and
the majority held that Wilko did not apply to international contracts. 7'
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart stated that the advantages of-
fered by the security buyer's right to sue in federal court "become chi-
merical [in the international context] since... an opposing party may by
speedy resort to a foreign court block or hinder access to the American
court of the purchaser's choice."'72 In fact, because of uncertainties as to
the applicable law, a contractual provision specifying the forum and the
applicable law is "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement
of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international busi-
ness transaction."73 Using this analysis, the majority managed to avoid
the Wilko issue.
In dictum, however, the majority suggested that Wilko might not ap-
ply to any claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The majority gave
two reasons for distinguishing such cases. First, unlike the express cause
of action created by section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, the private right of
action under section 10(b) is merely implied. Thus, according to the ma-
jority, the 1934 Act does not itself create any "special right" such as that
which the Wilko court found significant.74 Second, the 1934 Act, unlike
the 1933 Act, limits the plaintiff to federal court; thus, an arbitration
agreement's further restriction of the choice of forum is different,
although the majority did not explain the significance of this difference.7"
This two-part distinction between 1933 Act and 1934 Act cases came to
68. Id. at 435-37.
69. Id. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
70. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
71. See id. at 519-21.
72. Id. at 518.
73. Id. at 516.
74. See id. at 513-14.
75. See id. at 514.
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be known as the "colorable argument.""
The four Scherk dissenters would have extended Wilko to 1934 Act
claims. Justice Douglas' dissent rejected the argument that the jurisdic-
tional differences should matter: "While Alberto-Culver would not have
the right to sue in either a state or federal forum as did the plaintiff in
Wilko ... the Court deprives it of its right to have its Rule lOb-5 claim
heard in a federal court."77 The dissent then repeated Wilko's recitation
of the problems with arbitration and added a new one-federal pretrial
discovery would not be available in arbitration.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc v. Byrd,7" the next Supreme Court securities
arbitration case, also avoided deciding whether Wilko applied to causes
of action arising under the 1934 Act. The issue in Byrd was what to do
when a plaintiff asserted both federal securities claims, which presumably
could not be forced to arbitration, and pendent state law claims, which
could. Some of the circuits had developed what came to be known as the
"intertwining doctrine"-when the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims
were sufficiently intertwined factually and legally, a court could deny ar-
bitration of all the claims.79 In Byrd, the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the intertwining doctrine, but expressly refused to indicate
whether 1934 Act claims were arbitrable80 The Court limited its discus-
sion of Wilko to a footnote8' that pointed to the "colorable argument"
made in Scherk, but recognized that most of the lower courts had not
adopted the Scherk distinction and were following Wilko with respect to
1934 Act claims.8 2
76. See id at 513-14.
77. Id at 532 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
78. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
79. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. "In the District Court, Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitration of the
federal securities claims. Thus, the question whether Wilko applies to [section] 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims is not properly before us." Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216 n. 1.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 215-16 & n.1. Justice White filed a concurring opinion in Byrd calling
the application of Wilko to 1934 Act claims "a matter of substantial doubt," id. at 224
(White, J., concurring), and essentially repeating the "colorable argument" made in
Scherk. Justice White wrote:
Wilko's reasoning cannot be mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act. While
[section] 29 of that Act... is equivalent to [section] 14 of the 1933 Act, coun-
terparts of the other two provisions are imperfect or absent altogether. Jurisdic-
tion under the 1934 Act is narrower, being restricted to the federal courts ...
More important, the cause of action under [section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, in-
volved here, is implied rather than express.... The phrase 'waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter' . . . is thus literally inapplicable. Moreover,
Wilko's solicitude for the federal cause of action - the 'special right' estab-
lished by Congress... is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action
is judicially implied and not so different from the common-law action.
Id. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted). He concluded that "the con-
trary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed with some doubt." Id. at 225 (White,
J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence is especially interesting given his position in
Scherk. In Scherk, he joined Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion arguing that Wilko
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Scherk's introduction of the "colorable argument" had little effect on
the lower courts. They continued to apply Wilko to 1934 Act claims.83
After Byrd, however, the foundations of Wilko began to crumble-at
least slightly. Two courts of appeals8 4 and a number of federal district
courts85 held that agreements to arbitrate 1934 Act claims were enforcea-
ble. Nevertheless, the majority of courts of appeals continued to hold,
even after the decision in Byrd, that 1934 Act claims were not
arbitrable.86
C. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
In 1987, the Supreme Court finally confronted the issue of whether
arbitration agreements are valid under the 1934 Act. In Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc. v. McMahon,8 7 a bare majority of the Court held that
should be applied to 1934 Act claims. That dissent expressly rejected the "colorable
argument." See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 531-33 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In Byrd, he hinted strongly that his earlier position was wrong. See Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., Raiford v. Buslease, Inc., 745 F.2d 1419, 1421 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (applying
the rule in Wilko to preclude the arbitration of claims arising under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979)
(stating that holding and rationale of Wilko "are equally applicable" to claims under
1934 Act); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29
(10th Cir. 1978) (same); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 833-835 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d
Cir.) (stating general need for judicial tribunal in securities cases, court applied Wilko to
section 10(b) claim under 1934 Act), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating similarities between 1933 and 1934
Acts outweigh differences and thus Wilko is applicable to both), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37
(3d Cir.) (stating that Congress had accepted view that Wilko applies in the 1934 Act
context), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
84. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 296-98
(Ist Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393,
1397-98 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987).
85. See Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 635 F. Supp. 234 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 831 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1987); Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, 623 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker
Paribas, Inc. 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Bedell, Harrison & Har-
vey, The McMahon Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securities and RICO Claims, 19
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 17 & n.118 (1987) (citing additional cases).
86. See Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1987);
Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (1 1th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S.
923 (1987); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197,
1202 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 922 (1987); Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987);
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd,
482 U.S. 220 (1987). Bedell, Harrison & Harvey claimed that "[iln light of the Supreme
Court decisions in Byrd and Scherk, the majority of district courts have ordered arbitra-
tion when deciding the arbitrability of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims." Bedell,
Harrison & Harvey, supra note 85, at 17 & n.118.
87. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). McMahon also involved a claim under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). The Court
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predispute agreements to arbitrate 1934 Act claims are enforceable.""
Part III of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion began with a discussion
of section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, which, like section 14 of the 1933 Act,
declares void "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any per-
son to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder."8 9 Justice O'Connor argued that section 29(a)
does not prohibit waiver of section 27, which allows suit in federal court;
section 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed
by the 1934 Act. She interpreted Wilko as making this same distinc-
tion.90 The arbitration agreement in Wilko was unenforceable not be-
cause it conflicted with the jurisdictional provisions of the 1933 Act but
because arbitration was inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created
by section 12(2); the arbitration agreement thus constituted a waiver of
section 12(2) itself. "Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial
forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive
rights at issue." 9'
Justice O'Connor's reading of Wilko made her decision in McMahon
relatively easy. Cases decided by the Supreme Court after Wilko ap-
proved arbitration in spite of claims that substantive rights would not be
adequately protected. 92 As Justice O'Connor stated:
[T]he reasons given in Wilko reflect a general suspicion of the desira-
bility of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals - most
apply with no greater force to the arbitration of securities disputes
than to the arbitration of legal disputes generally. It is difficult to rec-
oncile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with this Court's subse-
quent decisions involving the Arbitration Act.
Indeed, most of the reasons given in Wilko have been rejected subse-
quently by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be
nonarbitrable.
93
Further, she argued, even if Wilko was right when decided, it was no
longer correct because of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") increased power to oversee the arbitration procedures of self-
regulatory organizations.9" Because arbitration procedures were no
decided unanimously that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate RICO claims were enforce-
able. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
88. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-38.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)(1988).
90. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-29.
91. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987). One
scholar has termed this reading of Wilko "revisionist history." See Fletcher, Learning to
Live with the Federal Arbitration Act - Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World,
37 Emory L.J. 99, 110 (1988).
92. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
93. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32 (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 233-34.
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longer inadequate to protect the substantive rights granted by the 1934
Act, the arbitration agreement was enforceable.
Justice O'Connor rejected the argument that congressional inaction
since Wilko, particularly when Congress adopted amendments to the
1934 Act in 1975, ratified the application of Wilko to 1934 Act claims. 95
The respondents relied on the following language in the conference re-
port on the amendments:
It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment
did not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan .... con-
cerning the effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements
entered into by persons dealing with members and participants of self-
regulatory organizations.
96
Justice O'Connor indicated that the comment might be construed as af-
fecting only Wilko's interpretation of the 1933 Act because Wilko's
holding did not concern 1934 Act claims. Even if the conference com-
mittee was referring to 1934 Act claims, she argued, Scherk and the "col-
orable argument" made it unclear at the time of the report exactly what
"existing law" was with respect to 1934 Act arbitration. Finally, she
noted that the conference report disclaimed any intent to change existing
law, leaving the issue to the courts. Thus, Congress had done nothing to
determine the outcome.97
Justice O'Connor offered only one comment on the continuing viabil-
ity of Wilko's 1933 Act holding: "While stare decisis concerns may
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the [1933]
Act, we refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the [1934] Act in light of
these intervening regulatory developments." 8 Justice O'Connor did not
mention the "colorable argument" for distinguishing 1933 Act and 1934
Act claims, a distinction that the SEC in an amicus brief had strongly
urged the Court to reject.99
Justice Blackmun's dissent in McMahon on the 1934 Act issue, which
was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stressed how fully the ma-
jority had broken from precedent.'0° Justice Blackmun disagreed with
the majority's reading of Wilko. Wilko, he argued, held that section 14
95. See id. at 234-35.
96. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 236-37 (1987) (ci-
tation omitted) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-229, 111 (1975)).
97. See id. at 236.
98. Id. at 234.
99. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners at 21, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) ("A major purpose of this brief is to urge the Court not to let the unsatisfactorily
explained decision in Wilko lead it to distinguish that case today on grounds that would
in our judgment be productive of mischief.").
100. Justice Stevens also chided the majority for its rejection of precedent. In a brief
opinion, he argued that the Supreme Court should respect the longstanding conclusion of
lower courts that Wilko was fully applicable to 1934 Act claims: "after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal
judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss
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prohibited waiver of the right to a judicial forum embodied in the 1933
Act's jurisdictional provision; it did not turn on the perceived inadequacy
of arbitration to enforce substantive rights under section 12(2). Because
the relevant 1934 Act provisions are "virtually identical," Justice Black-
mun argued, Wilko must prohibit waiver of the judicial forum for section
10(b) claims as well. 10
Even accepting the majority's interpretation of Wilko, Justice Black-
mun felt that the inadequacies of arbitration noted in Wilko still existed,
and that those inadequacies were still incompatible with the investor-
protection rationale of the federal securities laws.'" 2 Justice Blackmun
chided the SEC for changing its position on the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements and argued that SEC oversight of arbitration rules was
still inadequate to protect investors.' 0 3
The majority opinion, Justice Blackmun stated, "effectively over-
rule[d] Wilko."' ° According to Justice Blackmun, the relevant statu-
tory provisions in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act were "virtually
identical,"' ' and the "colorable argument," which the majority had not
mentioned and which commentators had almost uniformly rejected, was
unsupportable. 0 6 "That the Court passes over the 'colorable argument'
in silence, although petitioners have advanced it," Justice Blackmun ar-
gued, "would appear to relegate that argument to its proper place in the
graveyard of ideas."' 7
Justice Blackmun also argued that Congressional inaction at the time
of the 1975 amendments implicitly approved the application of Wilko to
the 1934 Act.'0  According to Justice Blackmun, the statement from the
conference report indicated that Congress did not want the amendments
to overrule Wilko. Rather, the statement's placement in materials
amending the 1934 Act suggested that Congress was aware of and sup-
ported the extension of Wilko to section 10(b) claims.
D. Confusion in the Lower Courts
McMahon presented the lower courts with a dilemma. Prior to Mc-
had been drafted by the Congress itself." Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. See id at 256-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. See id at 257-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. See id at 261-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 256 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 245 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that section
10(b)'s implied right of action is in no way inferior to the express right of action in section
12(2) and that the procedural protections available in a section 10(b) action are just as
pronounced as those available in a section 12(2) action. The jurisdictional differences
between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are not significant because "the proper question
is whether a [section] 10(b) or [section] 12(2) claimant is entitled to a judicial forum, not
whether the claimant has a choice between judicial fora." Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 246-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Mahon, lower courts had recognized the similarities between the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act and applied Wilko to claims under both statutes.
Then, in McMahon, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge those
statutory similarities and directly overrule Wilko. Wilko said "no" to
1933 Act arbitration, McMahon said "yes" to 1934 Act arbitration, and
yet the relevant statutory provisions were virtually identical. The one
possible distinction-the so-called "colorable argument"-was not men-
tioned in the majority opinion in McMahon and was resoundingly re-
jected in the dissent. Many commentators saw McMahon as effectively
overruling Wilko.' 0 9 At the least, commentators thought McMahon
made Wilko suspect. 110
The lower courts thus had to decide whether to follow a doubtful, but
live, Supreme Court precedent or acknowledge the obvious effect of the
Court's reasoning in McMahon and reject Wilko. Both courts that re-
jected Wilko,1' 1 and those that continued to apply it,1 2 acknowledged
109. See, e.g., Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, supra note 85, at 28 ("[T]he Supreme Court
has all but overruled Wilko v. Swan; at the very least, its precedential value has been
severely circumscribed."); Ginger, Managing Securities Disputes After McMahon: A Call
for Consolidation and Arbitration, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 515, 530-31 (1988) ("This drastic limi-
tation on the precedential value of Wilko, based on the notion that times - and arbitra-
tion procedures - have changed, seriously calls into question the continuing vitality of
the Wilko exception to the [Federal Arbitration Act] for claims arising under the [1933
Act]."); Note, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon: The Expanding Scope of Securi-
ties Arbitration, 12 Nova L. Rev. 1375, 1401 (1988) ("arguments for extending the Mc-
Mahon holding flow naturally from the Court's reasoning"); Note, Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon: What's Left for the Courts in Securities Litigation?, 62 Tul. L.
Rev. 284, 290 (1987) ("Despite its disclaimer, the Court effectively overruled Wilko.");
Note, SECURITIES - ARBITRATION - Agreements to Arbitrate are Valid, 10 U. Ark.
Little Rock L.J. 523, 533 (1987-88) ("[I]t is clear that the Court does not accept what it
perceives to be the reasoning of [the Wilko] opinion. Thus, when and if the issue is ever
properly before the Court, the Court will probably hold claims based on section 12(2) of
the Securities Act to be arbitrable."). But see Klein & Harkins, Significance for Investors
and the SEC, 20 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 195, 200 (1987) (reading McMahon as leaving
Wilko intact).
110. See Cleaves, An Irresistible Force Meets an Immovable Object: Reforming Current
Standards as to the Arbitration of Statutory Claims, 8 J. L. & Com. 245, 271 (1988);
Fletcher, supra note 91, at 113; Hood, Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers'
Claims Against Broker-Dealers After McMahon, 19 St. Mary's L.J. 541, 544 n.13 (1988);
Selig & Dinkoff, The McMahon Decision: Arbitration of Securities and Futures Disputes,
20 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 189, 190 n.Il (1987).
111. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298
(5th Cir. 1988) ("the reasoning in McMahon completely undermined Wilko"), aff'd, 490
U.S. 477 (1989); Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D. Fla.
1988) ("Clearly, McMahon has left the status of the Wilko doctrine in question.");
Kavouras v. Visual Prods. Sys., 680 F. Supp. 205, 207 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("Our review of
McMahon leaves us with the conviction that Wilko is now untenable."); Staiman v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (Mc-
Mahon "seriously undermined Wilko's rationale").
112. See, e.g., Sacco v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (McMahon "cast serious doubt on the continued viability of Wilko"); Araim v.
Painewebber, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("McMahon raises serious
questions about the vitality of Wilko's holding"); McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,
Nos. 86-2752-2758 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL 23008) (McMahon
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that McMahon created serious problems for Wilko. Only one deci-
sion, 1 3 however, discussed the resulting jurisprudential problem:
whether and when a lower court may ignore a doubtful but unreversed
Supreme Court precedent. Many courts blindly followed Wilko despite
its doubtful status. Other courts rejected Wilko with little expressed con-
cern for their duty to follow precedent.
1. Cases Following Wilko
Many of the post-McMahon cases that refused to enforce agreements
to arbitrate 1933 Act claims relied blindly on the principle of stare deci-
sis. For example, the district court in Goldberg v. Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert, Inc. 114 stated: "Wilko is still valid, even if its future validity has
been questioned.... The Supreme Court has not overruled Wilko, and
we must follow it."' 5 The lower courts assumed that, no matter how
tattered the precedent, a decision must be followed until the Supreme
Court expressly overrules it. The Supreme Court did not expressly over-
rule Wilko in McMahon, and to many of the lower courts that was
enough. 1 6
Only three cases following Wilko went beyond a bare recitation of
stare decisis. One of those cases, Araim v. Paine Webber, Inc,"' specifi-
cally dealt with the issue of anticipatory overruling. Araim rejected the
idea that district courts must "adhere slavishly to Supreme Court prece-
dents that have not been explicitly overruled.""'  Instead, a lower court
may decline to follow precedent that it believes the Supreme Court would
"cast serious doubt on the reasoning behind Wilko"); Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (after McMahon, "the
reasoning behind Wilko has been cut away").
113. See Araim, 691 F. Supp. at 1417.
114. No. 83 C. 8586 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 31604).
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. See, eg., McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Nos. 86-2752-58 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL 23008) ("Although [McMahon] cast serious doubt
in the reasoning behind Wlko, we find that the Securities Act claims are not arbitra-
ble."); Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1092, 1095
(S.D. Fla. 1987) ("[W]hile the reasoning behind Wlko has been cut away, its bare hold-
ing remains in force. Accordingly, this court is bound to follow the Wilko holding.");
McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("the
McMahon Court did not go so far as to overrule Wlko"), appeal dismissed, 889 F.2d 451
(2d Cir. 1989); Continental Serv. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
664 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (M.D. La. 1987) (Although McMahon questioned the "underly-
ing rationale" of Wilko, it did not overrule it); Santa v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No.
85-6421 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 49385) ("[A]lthough the ration-
ale of Wilko was seriously undermined by McMahon, Wlko specifically was not over-
ruled and continues to retain viability."); Helfricht v. Jefferies & Co., No. 850466
(D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 14777) ("It would be premature at this
time to conclude that Wilko has been overruled and that claims asserted under the Secur-
ities Act are subject to arbitration.").
117. 691 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
118. Id. at 1417-18.
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overrule if given the opportunity." 9 Araim recognized that McMahon
"raise[d] serious questions about the vitality of [the Wilko] holding,' 21
but the court concluded that "McMahon's reference to stare decisis and
the Supreme Court's traditional reluctance to reverse longstanding inter-
pretation of a statute, as opposed to the Constitution, make this court
unwilling to conclude that the overruling of Wilko is a near certainty."' 12 '
The other two cases 122 added substantive arguments to bolster Wilko
and distinguish McMahon. First, the legislative history quoted in Mc-
Mahon suggested that Congress had ratified Wilko, even though McMa-
hon held that Congress's action did not affect the 1934 Act issue.
Second, the "colorable argument" first made in Scherk was not rejected
by the McMahon majority, and thus supported a distinction between
Wilko and McMahon.12 3
2. Cases Rejecting Wilko
The post-McMahon cases rejecting Wilko also did not discuss the juris-
prudential issue.' 24 Finding Wilko's rationale inconsistent with McMa-
hon's, these cases simply rejected Wilko, paying little attention to the
McMahon majority's express refusal to overrule it. The discussion in
these cases centered not on the jurisprudential issue, but on the merits of
applying McMahon to 1933 Act arbitration.
These cases generally pointed to the similarity of the relevant provi-
sions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. They noted that section 29(a) of the
1934 Act is virtually identical to section 14, the 1933 Act anti-waiver
provision. 125 McMahon held that section 29(a) only bars waiver of the
119. Id. at 1418.
120. Id. at 1417.
121. Id. at 1418.
122. See Ketchum v. Almahurst Bloodstock IV, 685 F. Supp. 786, 792 (D. Kan. 1988);
Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.
Ga. 1987). Yet a third court adopted the Schultz analysis by reference. See Santa v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. 85-6421 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987
WL 49385).
123. See Ketchum, 685 F. Supp. at 792; Schultz, 666 F. Supp. at 220. Actually, as of
the McMahon decision, five of the sitting justices had rejected the "colorable argument."
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall rejected it in joining Justice Douglas's dissent in
Scherk. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Blackmun rejected the "colorable argument" in his McMahon dissent. See
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 244-45 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens implicitly rejected it in his separate opinion in
McMahon finding Wilko applicable to the 1934 Act. See id. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). However, as mentioned earlier, Justice White
apparently changed his mind in Byrd. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
124. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298-1299
(5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F.
Supp. 271, 273-275 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Kavouras v. Visual Prods. Sys., 680 F. Supp. 205,
207 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F.
Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
125. See Rodriguez, 845 F.2d at 1298; Schuster, 699 F. Supp. at 273-74; Benoay v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Ryan v. Liss, Tenner &
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substantive provisions of the 1934 Act, not the 1934 Act's jurisdictional
provisions. Therefore, these courts reasoned, compulsory arbitration is
rejected only when arbitration is inadequate to protect substantive
rights.'26 Given the almost identical provisions in the two statutes, these
courts reasoned that the McMahon holding applies to section 14 and the
1933 Act as well. 27 If so, the 1933 Act issue was an easy one to decide.
The substantive rights granted by the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are
quite similar. The McMahon majority itself concluded that modem arbi-
tration procedures under the regulatory oversight of the SEC were ade-
quate to protect the substantive rights granted by the federal securities
laws.'28 If arbitration was adequate to protect 1934 Act substantive
rights, it must also be adequate to protect substantive rights under the
1933 Act. As one court indicated, "[t]here is nothing to show that judi-
cial resolution is more necessary when 1933 Act claims are asserted than
when claims are brought under the 1934 Act."' 2 9 Under this reading,
Wilko was a historical anomaly made inapplicable by changed circum-
stances.' 30 "Indeed, the [McMahon] court stated that it believed Wilko
would have been determined differently had the arbitration process in
1953 provided an adequate substitute for adjudication.'"' Under this
view, agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act claims, like agreements to arbi-
trate 1934 Act claims, were enforceable.
Cases rejecting Wilko virtually ignored the "colorable argument" for
distinguishing claims brought under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The Fifth
Circuit opinion in Rodriguez mentioned the "colorable argument" but
Goldberg See. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480, 484 (D.N.J. 1988); Kaivuras, 680 F. Supp. at 207;
Aronson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Staiman, 673 F. Supp. at 101l.
126. See Rodriguez, 845 F.2d at 1298; Schuster, 699 F. Supp. at 274; Benoay, 699 F.
Supp. at 1527; Kavouras, 680 F. Supp. at 207-208; Rosenblum v. Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert Inc., 700 F. Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. La. 1987); Staiman, 673 F. Supp. at 1011; Aronson,
675 F. Supp. at 1326.
127. See Rodriguez, 845 F.2d at 1298 n.5; Schuster, 699 F. Supp. at 274; Bencay, 699
F. Supp. at 1526; Staiman, 673 F. Supp. at 1011.
128. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298 (5th
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Kavouras v. Visual Prods. Sys., 680 F. Supp. 205,
208 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Aronson, 675 F. Supp. at 1326; Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
129. Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
130. As one commentator argued,
the majority's comments in McMahon that the mistrust of arbitration which
formed the basis for the Wilko decision is no longer defensible, and that there-
fore 'Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbi-
tration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue,' authorize courts
to rule that Wilko no longer bars arbitration of claims brought under the Secur-
ities Act of 1933.
Ginger, supra note 108, at 532 n. 11.
131. Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & Goldberg Sec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480, 484 (D.NJ.
1988).
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summarily rejected it. 132 Most other courts did not even consider it. 133
Most courts also neglected the argument that Congress, by mentioning
Wilko in the debate on the 1975 amendments, intended to keep section
12(2) claims nonarbitrable. Again, the Fifth Circuit was the only excep-
tion, dismissing this argument in one sentence: "We find it implausible
that Congress intended to prohibit arbitration of Securities Act claims
but intended to allow courts to determine the arbitrability of Exchange
Act claims."1 3
4
3. Avoiding the Issue: A Possible Way Out
Surprisingly, almost no courts took the less controversial approach of
seizing on some other issue to avoid reaching the Wilko issue. For exam-
ple, the most obvious way to avoid the McMahon dilemma would have
been to hold that the parties' contract did not require arbitration of 1933
Act cases. Prior to 1987, SEC Rule 15c2-2 required that arbitration
clauses in customer agreements allow securities claims to be brought in
federal court.'35 This requirement was really nothing more than a regu-
latory restatement of Wilko. Courts could have read such contractual
provisions as barring arbitration of 1933 Act claims regardless of
whether the compulsory arbitration of such claims would be consistent
with the 1933 Act.136 Few courts took this opportunity, however, and
some even went out of their way to reach the Wilko question. For exam-
ple, in Continental Service Life & Health Ins. Co. v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc.,'137 decided only three days after McMahon, the district court
ignored a clause in the contract providing that the arbitration paragraph
"shall not apply to any controversy involving a nonspurious claim under
132. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
133. See supra notes 111-112. One state court, however, relied in part on a variant of
the "colorable argument" to hold that a 1933 Act claim was arbitrable:
Wilko was based largely on the fact that [section] 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides an express private right of action. Any private right of action
under [section] 17(a) of the same Act is implied, not express, just like any pri-
vate right of action recognized under [section] 10(b) of the 1934 Act, at issue in
McMahon. Therefore, Rocz's [section] 17(a) claim is arbitrable.
Rocz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 154 Ariz. 462, 465, 743 P.2d 971, 974 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987).
134. Rodriguez, 845 F.2d at 1299.
135. See Recourse to the Courts Notwithstanding Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer
Customer Agreements, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 20397, 48 Fed. Reg.
53,404 (1983).
136. See, e.g., Wehe v. Montgomery, 711 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Or. 1989) (stating
that agreement to arbitrate claims under 1933 and 1934 acts was unenforceable under
Rule 15c2-2); Mignocchi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 707 F. Supp.
140, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (construing language of arbitration agreement, court holds
that plaintiffs securities claims must be heard in judicial forum); Brick v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 677 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (D.D.C. 1987) ("as a matter of contract law [p]laintiff's
section 10(b) claim is not subject to arbitration").
137. 664 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. La. 1987).
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federal securities laws."' 38  In McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 13 9 another district court faced an addendum to a customer agree-
ment providing that the customer was "not required to arbitrate any dis-
pute or controversy that arises under the federal securities laws but
instead can resolve any such dispute or controversy through litigation in
the courts."'"' The court held that the addendum merely disclosed the
federal law existing at the time and did not itself create or preserve any
contractual right to litigate in federal court. Several other cases reached
similar results."' Only one published case in the period between McMa-
hon and Rodriguez used contractual language to avoid the Wilko issue.'
Thus, courts that might have avoided the issue went out of their way to
reach the Wilko question.
Similarly, courts not even presented with a Wilko problem reached out
in dictum to express their opinions. For example, in Chang v. Lin," 3 the
parties agreed in the district court that the plaintiffs' 1933 Act claims
were not arbitrable. The only issue on appeal was whether the 1933 Act
claims should be stayed pending arbitration of other, arbitrable claims.
The Second Circuit panel nevertheless discussed the viability of Wilko:
"Although the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale un-
derlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision,
and it continues to govern us.""' In a case involving only a 1934 Act
claim, a Tenth Circuit panel expressed its view that McMahon "essen-
tially overruled Wilko."' 45 A Third Circuit panel wrote that "[a]s long
as Wilko stands in the Supreme Court, agreements to arbitrate claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 will remain unenforceable,"' 46 and a
district court in that circuit dutifully responded."' Finally, in another
138. Id. at 1000.
139. 682 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 743.
141. See, e.g., Reed v. Bear, Steams & Co., 698 F. Supp. 835, 841 (D. Kan. 1988)
(contract provided that "this Agreement to arbitrate does not constitute a waiver of your
right to a judicial forum where such waiver would be void under the securities laws and
specifically does not prohibit you from pursuing any claim or claims arising under the
federal securities laws in any court of competent jurisdiction"); Ryan v. Liss, Tenner &
Goldberg Sec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480, 483 (D.N.J. 1988) (language nearly identical to
that in Reed); DeKuyper v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 695 F. Supp. 1367, 1368 (D. Conn.
1987) (contract provided that "[a]rbitration cannot be compelled with respect to disputes
arising under federal securities laws").
142. See Paulson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (D. Or.
1989), vacated, 905 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1990). In Paulson, the arbitration agreement
actually covered securities claims. The court, however, held that the agreement was un-
enforceable because it violated SEC Rule 15c2-2 when executed.
143. 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 222.
145. Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 849 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1988).
146. Osterneek v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508, 512 (3d
Cir. 1988). Curiously, an earlier panel of the Third Circuit had concluded that McMahon
distinguished Wilko "almost to extinction." Johnson v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Int'l Union Local No. 23, 828 F.2d 961, 966 (3d Cir. 1987).
147. See Sacco v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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1934 Act case, the Fifth Circuit cast its lot against Wilko in dictum:
"McMahon undercuts every aspect of Wilko v. Swan; a formal overruling
of Wilko appears inevitable - or, perhaps, superfluous."'
14 8
IV. THE DEATH OF WILKO AND OF ANTICIPATORY OVERRULING:
RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS v. SHEARSON/AMERICAN
EXPRESS, INa
The Supreme Court finally overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de QuUas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.14 9 Rodriguez, like Wilko, involved an
alleged violation by a broker of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. As in
Wilko, the petitioners had signed an agreement with the broker requiring
that all disputes relating to their accounts be settled through arbitration.
A bare majority of the justices overruled Wilko and held that the arbitra-
tion agreement was enforceable.150
A. The Court's Comments on Anticipatory Overruling
In light of McMahon, the Supreme Court's rejection of Wilko is not
surprising. The Court's strong criticism of the lower courts for their
handling of the dilemma McMahon created is surprising, however. All
of the justices firmly rejected the concept of anticipatory overruling. Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote:
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority
should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko. If a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the pre-
rogative of overruling its own decisions.'
5 1
These two sentences represent the majority's only comment on the issue.
The court gave no reason for rejecting anticipatory overruling, nor did it
consider why the lower courts had developed the doctrine. Justice Ste-
vens' dissent also criticized the lower courts, accusing them of engaging
in "an indefensible brand of judicial activism."' 52 Like the majority, the
dissent did not explain why anticipatory overruling was "indefensible."
Justice Stevens devoted most of his opinion to complaining that the ma-
jority's overruling of Wilko was indefensible. Thus, all of the justices
The court in Sacco relied on Osterneck to conclude that agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act
claims were unenforceable in the Third Circuit. See id. at 365.
148. Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
149. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
150. See id. at 1922. Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia joined Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion enforcing predispute agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act
claims. Justice Stevens filed a brief dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun.
151. Id. at 1921-22.
152. Id. at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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summarily rejected anticipatory overruling, without considering its pos-
sible benefits.
B. The Court's Substantive Analysis
The Rodriguez majority's strong defense of precedent is especially in-
teresting given the majority's treatment of its own precedent. Justice
Kennedy interpreted Wilko in a way that directly contradicts the major-
ity in McMahon. Justice O'Connor wrote in McMahon that Wilko did
not apply the antiwaiver provision to the 1933 Act's procedural provi-
sions. According to Justice O'Connor,
The conclusion in Wilko was expressly based on the Court's belief that
a judicial forum was needed to protect the substantive rights created by
the Securities Act... Wilko must be understood, therefore, as holding
that the plaintiff's waiver of the 'right to select the judicial forum' was
unenforceable only because arbitration was judged inadequate to en-
force the statutory rights created by [section] 12(2). 153
Justice Kennedy expressly rejected this reading of Wilko:
It has been recognized that Wilko was not obviously correct, for 'the
language prohibiting waiver of 'compliance with any provision of this
title' could easily have been read to relate to substantive provisions of
the Act without including the remedy provision.' Alberto-Culver Co. v.
Scherk. The Court did not read the language this way in Wilko, how-
154
ever ....
Justice Kennedy then concluded that Wilko was wrong and McMahon
was right: "[T]he right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice
of courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that [sec-
tion] 14 is properly construed to bar any waiver of these provisions."' 55
According to Justice Kennedy, McMahon involved the same question
under section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, and there was no reason to distin-
guish the two provisions.
Justice Kennedy expressly rejected one of the prongs of the "colorable
argument":
The only conceivable distinction in this regard between the Securities
Act and the Securities Exchange Act is that the former statute allows
concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over causes of action and the lat-
ter statute provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction. But even if this
distinction were thought to make any difference at all, it would suggest
that arbitration agreements, which are 'in effect, a specialized kind of
forum-selection clause,' Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., should not be
prohibited under the Securities Act, since they, like the provision for
concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of allowing buy-
153. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987)
(quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953)).
154. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1919
(1989) (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 1920.
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ers of securities a broader right to select the forum for resolving dis-
putes, whether it be judicial or otherwise. 156
As to the need to protect the 1933 Act's substantive provisions, Justice
Kennedy argued that the aversion to arbitration which pervaded Wilko
was "outmoded" and rejected by later decisions.1 57 Justice Kennedy's
opinion adopted McMahon's views on this issue without further
discussion. 158
Justice Kennedy concluded that it "would be undesirable for the deci-
sions in Wilko and McMahon to continue to exist side by side." 159 Ac-
cording to the Rodriguez majority, the 1933 and 1934 Acts are
interrelated parts of a single federal regulatory scheme, and they should
be construed harmoniously. Letting those two holdings coexist, Justice
Kennedy wrote, would undermine the rationale for harmonious con-
struction, "which is to discourage litigants from manipulating their alle-
gations merely to cast their claims under one of the securities laws rather
than another."1"
V. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ANTICIPATORY
OVERRULING
Rodriguez was a knee-jerk reaction by the Supreme Court to the re-
fusal of the lower courts to accept an iron-clad rule of stare decisis. The
Court saw a challenge to stare decisis and quashed it. The Court simply
failed to recognize the distinction between lower court rejection of a
strong precedent and lower court rejection of a precedent that the
Supreme Court itself would no longer follow. The lower courts that re-
jected Wilko in the aftermath of McMahon were not doing so to be un-
faithful to Wilko; they were doing so to be faithful to McMahon. The
Rodriguez Court, overly eager to protect the doctrine of stare decisis,
failed to consider whether the policy concerns behind stare decisis sup-
port a requirement that the lower courts blindly follow even the most
doubtful Supreme Court precedent. In fact, these policies do not support
such a requirement. Anticipatory overruling is not an attack on the poli-
cies supporting stare decisis; it is an affirmation of them.
Stare decisis is actually two related principles,' 6' one horizontal and
one vertical. The horizontal principle of stare decisis says that a court
should follow its own prior decisions. Once the Supreme Court has ruled
on an issue, it should follow that ruling whenever the same issue is
presented. The vertical principle of stare decisis says that a lower court
should follow the prior decisions of a higher court in the same appellate
156. Id. at 1921 (citation omitted).
157. See id. at 1920.
158. See id. at 1921.
159. Id. at 1922.
160. Id.
161. See Kelman, supra note 5, at 4.
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system. Once the Supreme Court has ruled on an issue, all of the other
federal courts should follow that ruling.
The rule that a court should follow its own prior decisions has never
been absolute. Horizontal stare decisis "has been considered by Ameri-
can courts to be more a rule of thumb than an iron-fisted command."' 162
Change in judicial decisions is inevitable. Society and technology change
and it would be foolhardy to constrain courts to the rules their predeces-
sors created in a bygone era.163 The likelihood that a court will reject a
prior decision increases as the judicial system matures. In 1789, the
Supreme Court had little reason to reject prior precedent. The body of
American precedent was sparse and the likelihood of doctrinal inconsis-
tency in the few existing opinions was small. Further, the pace of social
and technological change was slower. Today, however, a huge body of
Supreme Court precedent exists and both the pace of decision and the
pace of change are rapid. Friction between the old and the new is inevi-
table. This conflict is magnified when, as in the last ten years, the doctri-
nal leanings of the Court shift dramatically.
No one has suggested that the doctrine of stare decisis be abolished,
thereby enabling a court to reverse every prior decision it believes was
erroneously decided. Rather, the decision to overrule requires careful
balancing: "Baldly stated .... whether a precedent will be modified de-
pends on whether the policies which underlie the proposed rule are
strong enough to outweigh both the policies which support the existing
rule and the disadvantages of making a change."'' 65
The problem for lower courts is not that the Supreme Court overrules
its own precedent; that is inevitable. The problem is the Court's failure
162. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1361; see also Kelman, supra note 5, at 4 ("[(Jor most
American courts of final appeal the policy of maintaining uniformity of law over the
course of time is not inexorable"); Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court. Stare Decisis
and Law of the Case, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 514, 539 (1943) ("[t]he general American doctrine
behind stare decisis ... is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents").
163. See Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334 (1944); Stevens,
The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1983); Wise, The Doc-
trine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 1043, 1056-57 (1975). This is not necessarily an
argument in favor of the evolutionary view of constitutional or statutory interpretation
and against "original intent." To allow judges to change their own prior rules to meet
changing circumstances does not necessarily mean that they may ignore the clear com-
mands of the Constitution or legislation. If, however, the Supreme Court does have an
evolutionary view of the Constitution, the problem for lower courts discussed in this
Article becomes even more acute. See R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political
Seduction of The Law 155-59 (1990). Many of the problem cases referred to in this
article involve the Supreme Court's changing views on the Constitution.
164. See Stevens, supra note 163, at 4-5.
165. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 12 (1966); see also Jackson,
supra note 163, at 334 ("To overrule an important precedent is serious business. It calls
for sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the ques-
tioned case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other."); Stevens, supra note
163, at 9 ("Among the questions to be considered are the possible significance of interven-
ing events, the possible impact on settled expectations, and the risk of undermining public
confidence in the stability of our basic rules of law.").
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to do so candidly and certainly. A court may avoid its own precedent in
a number of ways without openly acknowledging it, and a court may
openly overrule its own precedent without acknowledging the full extent
of the doctrinal shift. Karl Llewellyn's famous list of techniques for deal-
ing with precedent includes at least thirteen ways to avoid a precedent
without expressly overruling it. 166 A court can distinguish the precedent
on its facts, interpret the old rule so that the new case falls outside of the
rule, limit or dismiss its broadest statement as dictum, or simply ignore
the old rule. Similarly, a court can overtly overrule a prior precedent in
ways that less directly attack the quality of the original ruling.167 The
court may argue that changed conditions have undermined the basis of
the original ruling. 168 The court may rely on what Professor Israel calls
the "lesson of experience"-the difficulties experienced in applying the
old rule. 169 Finally, the court may claim that the precedent overruled is
inconsistent with subsequent decisions by the court. 170
All of these techniques have costs. Uncertainty results when, as in
McMahon, the Supreme Court refuses to openly acknowledge the juris-
prudential impact of its decision, generating what one scholar calls "a
labyrinth of anomalies."' 7' As Justice Douglas once wrote, "[y]ears of
litigation may be needed to rid the law of mischievous decisions which
should have fallen with the first of the series to be overruled."'' 72 This
gradual process of erosion, not the departure from stare decisis, creates
166. See K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 84-87 (,1960).
Techniques 33 to 45 allow a court to avoid application of a precedent to the problem at
hand.
167. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Ct. Rev.
211, 219-25; see also Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering Na-
tional League of Cities, 2 Const. Commentary 123, 128 (1985) (discussing the Court's
flexibility in considering constitutional precedent). These conditions have also been sug-
gested as criteria for determining when overruling is proper. See Note, The Power that
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66
B.U.L. Rev. 345, 358-59 (1986).
168. Professor Israel argues that the change-in-circumstances rationale lets the court
avoid a direct attack on the validity of the decision when decided:
[Alan opinion emphasizing the changed circumstances naturally will contain the
counter suggestion that, in any event, the former Court might well have decided
differently if confronted with today's conditions. Thus, with the change-in-cir-
cumstances rationale, the Court may obtain the best of both worlds. Not only is
the prior decision overruled, but the adverse emphasis upon differences in the
Court's personnel that normally attends such action is eliminated, or at least
diluted, by relying upon grounds consistent with that concept of impersonal
decision-making ordinarily supported by stare decisis.
Israel, supra note 167, at 221 (footnote omitted).
169. Again, this allows the overruling court to minimize the effect of changes in court
personnel "by either the outright suggestion or, at least, the insinuation that the present
result was one that its predecessors might well have reached if they had had the same
information, derived from experience under the rule first promulgated." Id. at 222.
170. See id. at 223-25. Of course, this begs the obvious question-why did those other
cases not follow the prior precedent? See K. Llewellyn, supra note 166, at 87.
171. See Wise, supra note 163, at 1057.
172. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 749 (1949).
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the problem that courts seek to solve through anticipatory overruling.' 73
A return to a rigid rule of stare decisis is not needed. Rather, the
Supreme Court should openly and candidly acknowledge whether it is
rejecting a prior precedent and state plainly the doctrinal changes it is
making.174
A. The Argument for Anticipatory Overruling
Anticipatory overruling facilitates growth in the law because legal
rules can adjust to changes in doctrine faster if each issue does not re-
quire separate Supreme Court resolution."' Once the Supreme Court
has announced a doctrinal change, the lower courts can adjust the legal
rules accordingly. Correction of old precedent need not depend on
whether individual cases reach the Supreme Court. Anticipatory over-
ruling thus promotes growth in the law much like the Supreme Court's
overruling of its own precedents, but at a more rapid pace.
1. Treatment of Brown v. Board of Education
Two cases arising in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education 176
illustrate the stifling effect the Rodriguez position could have. Brown v.
Board of Education, decided in 1954, rejected the separate-but-equal doc-
trine and held that racial segregation in public education was constitu-
tionally impermissible. 77 Two challenges to segregation policies on
buses followed the Brown decision.'7" At the time those cases arose, the
Supreme Court had not expressly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, "9 which
allowed segregated public transportation. Under the Rodriguez view, the
lower courts would have been required to follow Plessy and uphold the
segregated bus policies, even though Brown clearly disapproved of public
racial segregation. In fact, lower courts refused to follow Plessy. One
lower court noted that "a judicial decision, which is simply evidence of
the law and not the law itself, may be so impaired by later decisions as no
longer to furnish any reliable evidence."' 10 The Fourth Circuit wrote:
We do not think that the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fer-
173. See id
174. See Douglas, supra note 172, at 749; Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions
Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1979); Wise, supra note 163, at 1057.
175. See Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520
(1965); Kniffin, supra note 7, at 80; Comment, Predicting the Demise, supra note 20, at
93.
176. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
177. Id. at 495.
178. Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955),
appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
179. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Attempts to check the subsequent history Plessy illustrate
the problems dealt with in the text. Both Shepard's United States Citations and the
Auto-Cite service available on LEXIS incorrectly indicate that Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion overruled Plessy. Actually, Plessy has never been expressly overruled.
180. Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 716.
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guson can any longer be regarded as a correct statement of the law.
That case recognizes segregation of the races by common carriers as
being governed by the same principles as segregation in the public
schools; and the recent decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and
Bolling v. Sharpe, which relate to public schools, leave no doubt that
the separate but equal doctrine approved in Plessy v. Ferguson has
been repudiated. That the principle applied in the school cases should
be applied in cases involving transportation, appears quite clearly from
the recent case of Henderson v. United States where segregation in
dining cars was held violative of a section of the interstate commerce
act providing against discrimination.18 1
Without anticipatory overruling, legal progress is segmented. The law
lurches forward first in one limited area and then in another, as the
Supreme Court slowly changes its rules on a narrow, case-by-case basis.
Policies that the Supreme Court no longer approves remain frozen in
time. Obsolete, disapproved rulings continue to control people's behav-
ior until a case presenting that precise issue again works its way to the
Supreme Court. Anticipatory overruling, on the other hand, allows the
law to adjust to changes in Supreme Court policy more rapidly. The
transition is smoother and the benefits of new federal policies become
available to the public more quickly.
2. Treatment of Lochner-Era Cases
Lower court treatment of the Supreme Court's Lochner-era decisions
presents an interesting contrast between anticipatory overruling and ab-
solute stare decisis.' 8 2 Gold v. DiCarlo 183 presented a constitutional chal-
lenge to a New York statute regulating the price at which licensed
brokers could resell theatre and other tickets to places of public amuse-
ment. The predecessor to the New York statute had been declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in Tyson & Brother v. Banton,"s4 a
1927 decision. Tyson held that New York had no power to regulate the
resale prices of theatre and sports tickets because they were not "affected
with a public interest." '85 After Tyson, the Supreme Court decided
Nebbia v. New York,' 86 which upheld a state statute regulating the retail
price of milk. Nebbia said that due process required only that state regu-
lation not be arbitrary or discriminatory and have a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose. 8 7 In Olsen v. Nebraska, 8 1 the Supreme
181. Flemming, 224 F.2d at 752-53 (citations omitted).
182. See Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520
(1965); Skrupa v. Sanborn, 210 F. Supp. 200 (D. Kan. 1961), rev'd sub nom. Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62
(E.D.S.C. 1948), rev'd, 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
183. 235 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520 (1965).
184. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
185. Tyson & Brother, 273 U.S. at 430 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126
(1877)).
186. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
187. See id. at 537.
[Vol. 59
ANTICIPATORY OVERRULING
Court subsequently upheld a state statute regulating fees charged by em-
ployment agencies. The Gold court believed that Olsen effectively dis-
carded the Tyson standard.'89 Tyson had not been overruled, but the
Gold court noted that it was "obsolescent" and should be disregarded.
The court wrote:
We would be abdicating our judicial responsibility if we waited for the
Supreme Court to use the express words 'We hereby overrule Tyson,'
as the plaintiffs contend we should, before recognizing that the case is
no longer binding precedent but simply a relic for the constitutional
historians. Judges do not have such mechanical or wooden attitudes
nor are they devoid of all powers of interpretation, analogy and appli-
cation of constitutional principles; they and the law must keep pace
with our vibrant and dynamic society and the changes in the law
which the courts have pronounced.190
The district courts' positions in Family Security Life Ins. Co. v.
Daniel 91 and Skrupa v. Sanborn 192 present an interesting contrast to the
court's position in Gold. In Daniel, the plaintiff sued to enjoin enforce-
ment of a South Carolina statute prohibiting insurance companies from
having ties to mortuaries. The Daniel court relied on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,93 which struck down as
unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute limiting drug store ownership to
licensed pharmacists. Over a strong dissent by Judge Dobie,9'a the
Daniel court invalidated the South Carolina statute and held that a dis-
trict court had no power to reject Liggett:
[T]he defendants assume that the Liggett case, if followed by this
Court, would require the granting of plaintiffs' prayer. However, they
point to Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent and assert that we should con-
clude that the present constituency of the Supreme Court will follow
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes rather than the majority
188. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
189. See Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd. 380 U.S. 520
(1965).
190. Id. at 819-20.
191. 79 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.S.C. 1948), rey'd, 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
192. 210 F. Supp. 200 (D. Kan. 1961), rev'd sub nom Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
193. 278 U.S. 105 (1928), overruled, North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's
Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
194. Judge Dobie wrote:
[t]here has been a decided swing in the viewpoint of the United States Supreme
Court in this field. Formerly, the Court seemed willing to strike down State
statutes on the score that these statutes contravened the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis in the earlier cases have
now been quite generally upheld.... The modem cases have stressed the idea
that questions of policy are for the legislature and not for the courts, and that
courts cannot strike down a statute merely because they think the statute is
unwise or because it is not the best remedy for the apparent evil. These cases
give wide latitude to State legislatures for experimental legislation in economic
and social fields.
Daniel, 79 F. Supp. at 74 (Dobie, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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opinion of the Court. We cannot agree to the view that lower courts
may review the decisions of the Supreme Court, and, following the
predilection for individual justices, subvert the salutary doctrine of
stare decisis into a study of personalities rather than a becoming obser-
vance of the accepted majority decisions of the Supreme Court. We
are firmly of the opinion that if the decisions of the Supreme Court are
to be reversed, that function should be reserved to the Supreme Court
itself. Any other rule would bog down the judicial processes hope-
lessly in those quagmires of uncertainty which would justly lay the
District Courts open to the gravest public censure. It is not our duty
to speculate on what the Supreme Court as now constituted may do on
an appeal in this case. It is our duty to decide the case as we think it
ought to be decided on the decisions as they now stand. 195
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed. 196
A similar approach was taken by the district court in Skrupa v.
Sanborn. The plaintiff challenged a Kansas statute prohibiting "debt ad-
justing" except as incident to the practice of law. 197 The district court
held that the statute was unconstitutional. Although the district court
did not cite a Supreme Court case to support its opinion, on appeal the
Supreme Court read the lower court's opinion as adopting the philoso-
phy of Adams v. Tanner,98 which held that a state could not prohibit a
business that is "useful" and "not inherently immoral or dangerous to
public welfare."' 99 Noting later decisions that abandoned such Lochner-
type reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed.2"
Daniel, Skrupa v. Sanborn and Gold offer a clear illustration of the
choice between anticipatory overruling and a rigid rule of stare decisis.
In Daniel and Skrupa v. Sanborn, the district courts adopted a strict rule
of stare decisis and followed questionable Lochner-era cases. In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court intervened to update the law. In Gold, on the
other hand, the lower court, sensing that the Supreme Court was moving
away from its Lochner-era precedents, was able to anticipate the change
that the Supreme Court subsequently made.
B. The Argument Against Anticipatory Overruling
The Supreme Court's unexplained rejection of anticipatory overruling
in Rodriguez undoubtedly results from a rigid application of stare decisis:
stare decisis is a good policy; therefore, it must be good in all contexts.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the arguments in favor of stare
decisis fail, or are at least much weaker, in situations where anticipatory
overruling is appropriate.
195. Id. at 68-69.
196. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949).
197. See Skrupa v. Sanborn, 210 F. Supp. 200, 201 (D. Kan. 1961), rev'd sub nora.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
198. 244 U.S. 590 (1917), overruled, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
199. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 728 (quoting Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. at 593).
200. See id. at 731; supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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Four categories of policy arguments support a general rule of stare
decisis: (1) predictability, certainty and reliability; (2) fairness and uni-
formity of treatment; (3) judicial economy and (4) protecting the public
image of the courts. The same policies supporting horizontal stare deci-
sis generally support vertical stare decisis.2 ' Additional policy argu-
ments are sometimes made against anticipatory overruling. Some argue
that anticipatory overruling violates a duty of obedience owed by the
lower court to the higher court.2 0 2 Others argue that anticipatory over-
ruling requires a unique type of speculative judgment that courts are not
competent to make.2 °3 Although these policies undoubtedly favor lower
court adherence to unquestioned Supreme Court precedent, such policies
do not always support lower court adherence where the precedent is
doubtful. In this context, the Supreme Court has already questioned its
own precedent. The question is not whether the lower court should fol-
low the Supreme Court, but how the lower court should follow the
Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court casts doubt on its own prece-
dent, it is better for the lower court to reject the doubtful precedent and
follow the doctrinal developments in more recent decisions. The same
policies that usually favor stare decisis favor anticipatory overruling in
these situations.
1. Predictability, Certainty and Reliability
The argument for predictability, certainty and reliability focuses on
the justified expectations of the parties. Stare decisis allows people to
make decisions and plan their conduct with confidence that the legal
rules on which they rely will not be changed retroactively to make their
conduct wrongful. Therefore, lawyers can advise their clients "with a
reasonable degree of confidence that certain acts will produce certain
consequences." 2" Such predictability and reliability decreases the risk
associated with transactions covered by known legal rules and thereby
decreases the overall cost of such transactions. No one must be compen-
sated to bear the risk of a change in the law.
Predictability is always reduced when courts depart from stare decisis.
If the Supreme Court may change its mind, individuals are less able to
predict the rules that will be applied to their conduct. Transactions be-
come more costly because of the resulting risk. As Justice Roberts ar-
201. See generally Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 495
(1985) (inquiring into the rationales for stare decisis and the reasonable scope of the
doctrine); Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 595-602 (1987) (outlining policy ar-
guments supporting strict rule of stare decisis); Sprecher, The Development of the Doc-
trine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501,
505-506 (1945) (listing arguments in support of stare decisis); Note, supra note 167, at
347-48 (same).
202. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 74-75; infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
203. See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1087 (1976); infra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
204. Sprecher, supra note 201, at 505.
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gued, "the law becomes not a chart to govern conduct but a game of
chance. ' 20-
The argument for certainty and predictability is easily overstated,
however, even in the horizontal stare decisis context.20 6 For instance,
stare decisis does not protect the parties against legislative changes to the
law, although the legislative (and constitutional) norm against retroac-
tive application of newly enacted laws has the practical effect of provid-
ing some protection. Certainty is not guaranteed even if the inquiry is
limited to the judiciary. The rule of stare decisis is not absolute and is
often breached, so the risk of change is only reduced, not eliminated. In
any event, the risk that a court might overrule prior decisions is probably
small compared to the risk associated with legal questions not yet de-
cided. The reduction of transaction costs produced by stare decisis is
thus relatively small. Finally, some legal rules present no potential reli-
ance problem. For example, a criminal defendant cannot be said to have
relied on the existing test for insanity, for that very reliance presupposes
sanity. In such cases, neither party's conduct is affected by the existing
legal rule, and no justified expectations would suffer if that rule were
changed. Of course, even in these cases, lawyers may rely on the existing
rule once a case arises, so some reliance interest is still associated with
stare decisis, but that interest is small. 20 7
In spite of its limitations, the argument for certainty and predictability
is clearly valid in many cases. Some have extended this argument to
anticipatory overruling, arguing that anticipatory overruling leads to
chaos and a resulting breakdown in predictability.20 The validity of the
205. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 112 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
206. See Schaefer, supra note 165, at 12.
207. The argument that uniformity and certainty require a rigid stare decisis rule mir-
rors the general argument for a rule-based jurisprudence over one requiring a case-by-
case analysis of the equities. The modern rejection of the rules-oriented approach in
other fields might portend changes to the rule of stare decisis. For example, the argument
for the traditional territorial conflict of law rules, represented by the First Restatement,
was that the need for certain, uniformly applied rules outweighed the need for a more
"just" result in particular cases. See D. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process 22-24 (1965).
The territorial rules approach has been rejected by some courts in favor of one of several
approaches falling under the general heading of interest analysis. See generally R. Leflar,
L. McDougal, III & R. Felix, American Conflicts Law 281-305 (4th ed. 1986) (discussing
the evolution of choice-of-law theory as reflected in judicial decisions). These approaches
generally call for a case-by-case review of the particular facts and policies, rather than the
application of a broad, inflexible rule. Professors Scoles and Hay point out that the
evolution of these rules resulted from a focus on what courts really did rather than the
rules they purported to be following. See E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws 32-33
(1984). A similar focus might produce a new approach to stare decisis, rather than the
invocation of an absolute rule that is frequently violated.
208. See, e.g., Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) ("[a]ny hope of certainty must be abandoned"); United States v. Silverman,
166 F. Supp. 838, 840 ( D.D.C. 1958) ("Such speculation might perhaps lead to a chaotic
situation, since different judges might reach different results by this means."), rev'd, 365
U.S. 505 (1961); Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62, 69 (E.D.S.C.
1948) ("would bog down the judicial processes hopelessly in . . . quagmires of uncer-
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predictability/certainty argument in this context is less clear. The
Supreme Court's own willingness to depart from precedent lessens pre-
dictability; anticipatory overruling by the lower courts, if done correctly,
merely accelerates the inevitable change. If lower courts must follow a
precedent that the Supreme Court has cast into doubt, then predictability
is lessened. Whether, and when, the Supreme Court will eventually over-
rule a doubtful precedent is uncertain and highly unpredictable. The
parties may or may not have the doubtful precedent applied to their con-
duct. Anticipatory overruling actually enhances predictability because
the parties can be reasonably certain that the old rule will not be applied
to their conduct.
Some scholars argue that the result should be different when the par-
ties have acted in reliance on the existing precedent." 9 If the reliance
interest is strong enough, these authors claim, the lower court should not
disregard the doubtful Supreme Court precedent. This reliance argu-
ment is misdirected. The reliance interest should affect the lower court's
prediction of whether the Supreme Court will overrule because the
Supreme Court will consider reliance in deciding whether to overrule
and, if so, whether to overrule retroactively or prospectively.2 1 If the
lower court is convinced, however, that the Supreme Court would over-
rule the precedent in spite of any reliance interest, then any resulting
unfairness must be charged to the Supreme Court. The lower court is
merely predicting what the Supreme Court would do and following that
prediction. To allow the Supreme Court to disturb the reliance interest
by retroactive application of its decisions while denying that same power
to lower courts is incongruous.
In any event, the reliance argument is circular when applied to doubt-
ful precedent. Reliance on a questionable precedent is justified only if a
party is convinced that the precedent will be applied in future cases. If a
Supreme Court precedent is doubtful enough to convince a lower court
that the Supreme Court would overrule it, reliance is justified only if
there is an absolute rule against anticipatory overruling by lower courts.
If anticipatory overruling is allowed, reliance on the doubtful rule is not
justified. The parties should anticipate that the precedent will be disre-
tainty"), rev'd, 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Cooper, supra note 5, at 402 n.6 ("the alternative is
... obviously chaos"); Kniffin, supra note 7, at 82-83 (discussing arguments for and
against anticipatory overruling).
209. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 76-77; Comment, Predicting the Demise, supra note
20, at 99-100.
210. See, &g., Patsy v. Board of Regents of New York, 457 U.S. 496, 501 n.3 (Supreme
Court did not overrule prior precedents because, in part, "[o]verruling these decisions
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had forgone or waived their state administrative
remedies in reliance on these decisions"); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-
109 (1971) (litigant's reliance on a prior legal rule is a factor in deciding whether decision
abolishing that rule should be applied retroactively). See generally, Eskridge, supra note
4, at 1382-84 (where there is great reliance on precedent, it is presumptively unfair to
overrule retroactively).
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garded by the lower courts.21'
2. Fairness and Uniformity
The fairness argument for stare decisis focuses on the desire to treat
similar cases alike. Stare decisis forces judges to apply the law equally
and uniformly to all similarly situated litigants. According to this argu-
ment, stare decisis protects against judicial partiality or prejudice,
whether that partiality or prejudice results from corruption or igno-
rance.212 The problem lies in defining what is meant by "similar" cases.
Every case is in some way different from all others, and many cases that
may not be considered "similar" for stare decisis purposes nevertheless
contain common elements. Unless there is some clear way to character-
ize and categorize cases, a judge is always free to seize upon a minor
difference, characterize the earlier precedent as dissimilar and apply a
different rule. This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in McMahon
when it refused to apply Wilko to 1934 Act claims.21 3
Whatever its effect with respect to horizontal stare decisis, the argu-
ment for fairness and uniformity supports anticipatory overruling. Let-
ting the result of a particular case depend upon whether a party can
afford to take the case to the Supreme Court or upon whether certiorari
is granted is unfair.214 If the lower court woodenly follows a precedent
that it strongly believes the Supreme Court would overrule, justice de-
pends on whether the Supreme Court grants review to a particular liti-
gant's case. Anticipatory overruling promotes equal treatment of all
litigants.
Professor Kniffin argues that anticipatory overruling could result in
geographical inconsistency: "To the extent that a court of appeals may
anticipate, while another circuit or a district court may not do so in a
case involving the same issue, different law will be applied according to
the accident of which court hears a case."2 5 Geographical inconsistency
of this sort could have two causes: (1) some courts might follow an abso-
lute rule requiring them to rigidly follow all Supreme Court precedent,
while others may not; and (2) even if all lower courts were to accept the
concept of anticipatory overruling, they might nevertheless disagree as to
whether the Supreme Court would overrule a particular precedent.
Neither the anticipatory overruling nor the blind adherence approach
may be faulted for inconsistency of the first sort. Disparity in the first
211. The situation is somewhat different when a party relies on the precedent and
thereafter a later Supreme Court decision renders the first ruling doubtful. In this case,
the party's reliance was justified. However, if the lower court is clearly convinced that
the party's reliance would not deter the Supreme Court from retroactively overruling the
first precedent, it is unclear why the lower court should give greater weight to the reliance
interest than the Supreme Court would.
212. See Sprecher, supra note 201, at 505-506.
213. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
214. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 75-76.
215. Id. at 82.
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case results from uncertainty as to what the appropriate federal rule is.
Regardless of the answer, once the Supreme Court announces with cer-
tainty whether and when anticipatory overruling is proper, the first type
of inconsistency vanishes. Such uncertainty affords no reason to choose
one approach over the other.
The second cause of inconsistency is more troubling. Courts will cer-
tainly disagree about whether the Supreme Court is likely to overrule
some precedents. A standard such as "clear conviction" or "certainty"
makes such disagreement less likely, but does not eliminate it.216 The
possibility still exists that one circuit will follow a Supreme Court prece-
dent while another circuit will reject it. This problem, however, is not
unique to doubtful precedent. Geographical inconsistencies arise when
lower courts interpret the scope of authoritative precedent or make deci-
sions in cases where there is no authoritative precedent. Geographical
inconsistencies also arise when lower courts must determine whether a
later Supreme Court decision has directly overruled a prior precedent.
These examples do not excuse the addition of another possible geographi-
cal disparity, but they do make it less troubling. Compared to these
other instances of geographical inconsistency, the inconsistency resulting
from anticipatory overruling may be insignificant.
Departing from a rigid rule of stare decisis also creates a problem of
temporal inconsistency-like cases are not treated alike if they arise at
different times. A case that arises while the Supreme Court precedent is
still strong will be decided differently than the identical case arising after
the Supreme Court overrules that precedent. Of course, if temporal uni-
formity were the only concern, courts would never overrule either their
own, or a higher court's, earlier decisions. If the Supreme Court can
depart from stare decisis and overrule its own decisions, temporal incon-
sistency is unavoidable. The question is to what extent lower courts
should adhere to a precedent when a case arises after Supreme Court
decisions make such precedent doubtful, but before the Supreme Court
itself overrules that precedent. Neither blind adherence nor anticipatory
overruling produces temporal uniformity, but, at least where there is lit-
tle doubt as to the impaired value of a prior precedent, anticipatory over-
ruling applies the rule the Supreme Court now believes to be correct to a
greater number of people.
3. Judicial Economy
The judicial economy argument claims that stare decisis makes judicial
216. One commentator argues that the lower courts should not anticipate the overrul-
ing in cases where the lower courts are likely to disagree. See Comment, Predicting the
Demise, supra note 20, at 99-100. This merely changes the focus from whether the
Supreme Court is likely to overrule to whether the lower courts are likely to disagree.
Geographical disuniformity is still possible if one court thinks the question is controver-
sial and therefore follows the doubtful precedent but another court thinks it is not and
disregards the doubtful precedent.
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decision making easier. Rather than decide each case anew, courts can
rely on past decisions. According to this view, stare decisis decreases the
workload of the courts, giving them more time to focus on undecided
questions.2" A problem with this argument is that stare decisis also
forces courts to spend more time on undecided questions. If a decision
will be binding on all later, similar cases, the consequences of an incor-
rect first decision are much harsher. Consequently, the court must (or
perhaps should) be more careful to decide correctly the first time. The
more likely an issue is to arise again, the more care the court must take to
reach the right decision when that issue is initially presented. In addi-
tion, once a precedent exists, a great deal of time and effort in later cases
goes into characterizing and distinguishing earlier precedent, time and
effort that might go to direct analysis of law and policy if there were no
rule of stare decisis. Although practical experience leads one to believe
that horizontal stare decisis promotes judicial economy, theory cannot
predict the net result in light of these conflicting pressures.
The effect of anticipatory overruling on judicial economy is indetermi-
nate. Some authors have argued that anticipatory overruling will in-
crease the number of lawsuits2"' and decrease the number of
settlements.21 9 Plaintiffs who would have lost if the lower courts blindly
followed the doubtful precedent are more likely to sue because the pros-
pect of anticipatory overruling will increase their chances of ultimate vic-
tory. Victory would no longer depend on a successful Supreme Court
challenge. Justice Roberts made this argument in a dissent in Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co.2210:
In the present case, the court below naturally felt bound to follow and
apply the law as clearly announced by this court. If litigants and lower
federal courts are not to do so, the law becomes not a chart to govern
conduct but a game of chance; instead of settling rights and liabilities it
unsettles them. Counsel and parties will bring and prosecute actions in
the teeth of the decisions that such actions are not maintainable on the
not improbable chance that the asserted rule will be thrown overboard.
Defendants will not know whether to litigate or to settle for they will
have no assurance that a declared rule will be followed.22'
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court is likely to change the applica-
ble law, it is more just to grant such relief than to apply what the present
Supreme Court sees as an incorrect rule solely to reduce the judicial
workload.2 11 More importantly, Justice Roberts' criticism is one-sided.
217. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 201, at 599; Sprecher, supra note 201, at 506; Note,
supra note 167, at 348.
218. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 84; Note, supra note 5, at 168.
219. See Note, supra note 5, at 168.
220. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
221. Id. at 112-113 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts criticized the Supreme
Court for failing to follow its own precedents, but the quoted portion of his opinion
appears to contemplate anticipatory overruling by the lower courts.
222. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 84; Note, supra note 5, at 168.
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Anticipatory overruling will increase litigation by plaintiffs who would
lose if the doubtful precedent were blindly followed, but should decrease
litigation by plaintiffs who would win in the absence of anticipatory over-
ruling. This latter group of plaintiffs now has a smaller chance of vic-
tory. Anticipatory overruling will discourage settlements by defendants
whom the change benefits, but will encourage settlements by defendants
whom the old precedent supports. Accordingly, the net effect on the
amount of litigation is indeterminate.223
Further, if litigants assume that, on average, the lower courts correctly
predict what the Supreme Court will do,224 anticipatory overruling is
likely to result in fewer appeals. 225 Because the lower court ruling is
more likely to represent the ultimate Supreme Court result, the losing
party is less likely to win on appeal and is thus less likely to appeal.
Anticipatory overruling may also decrease the Supreme Court's work-
load because the Court would no longer have to review the new case in
order to eliminate the old doctrine. 226 The Court may have to review
more cases where a lower court incorrectly anticipated an overruling,
but, again assuming that the lower courts are correct more often than
not, the Supreme Court loses more cases than it gains. In order to con-
firm the rejection of precedent and prevent discord in the lower courts,
the Supreme Court may still want to review decisions where the lower
court's anticipatory overruling was correct.227 If so, the net effect on the
Supreme Court's workload is uncertain.228
4. Public Image of the Courts
Another reason sometimes offered in support of horizontal stare deci-
sis is that overruling prior decisions damages the public image of the
courts. Justice Roberts argued that, if courts do not honor stare decisis,
223. This assumes that Supreme Court overrulings are party-neutral; that is, on aver-
age, they favor neither the plaintiff nor the defendant. If the court is expansionistic, as it
was during the 1960's, the overrulings are likely to favor plaintiffs, and, everything else
being equal, litigation should increase. If the court is retrenching, as it seems to have
been during the 1980's, the overrulings are likely to favor defendants, and litigation
should decrease.
224. This assumption does not require that lower courts always be right in predicting
what the Supreme Court will do, only that they are more often right than wrong. A
failure of this assumption is a general indictment of either the ability of the lower courts
to analyze Supreme Court opinions or the consistency of the Supreme Court. If the as-
sumption is not true, a coin toss would be a better predictor of Supreme Court action.
225. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 83; Note, supra note 5, at 168; Comment, Predicting
the Demise, supra note 20, at 99.
226. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 83-84; Comment, Predicting the Demise, supra note
20, at 92.
227. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 83-84.
228. Kniffin argues that the Supreme Court's workload is rarely increased by anticipa-
tory overruling. See id at 83-84. However, Kniffin assumes that the lower court will rule
as the Supreme Court would; he does not consider the possibility that the lower court will
be wrong. When wrong decisions are considered, a net increase in the Supreme Court's
workload is at least possible, although I agree with Kniffin that such a result is unlikely.
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"the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the administra-
tion of justice will fall into disrepute. Respect for tribunals must fall
when the bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has
been said in prior adjudication has force in a current controversy. "229
Some authorities have cited this concern as a reason for rejecting antici-
patory overruling: "Any other rule would bog down the judicial
processes hopelessly in those quagmires of uncertainty which would
justly lay the District Courts open to the gravest public censure. 230
Whether the public perception argument has much weight, even in the
horizontal context, is unclear. Actually doing justice may be more im-
portant than appearing to do justice if these two interests collide. How-
ever, because the rule of law and the ability to do justice are highly
dependent upon public confidence in the legal system, the public image
argument has some validity. Even accepting public perception as an im-
portant value, however, it is unclear that the public reacts negatively
when a case is overruled. Public debate on the Supreme Court's recent
flag-burning 231 and abortion23 2 decisions shows that the general public
tends to focus on results rather than process. If the new decision reaches
a substantive result that people believe is good, they applaud the decision
even if precedent is discarded. If the new decision reaches a substantive
result that people believe is bad, they decry the decision even if the case
results from a straightforward application of precedent. If outdated, so-
cially unacceptable or logically questionable decisions are those most
likely to be overruled or questioned by the Supreme Court, replacing
such decisions with a more publicly acceptable rule should actually in-
crease public respect for the system. The same may be said for a lower
court that disregards a doubtful Supreme Court precedent.
It is difficult to fault the lower court when it disregards a doubtful
precedent, even if the public image of the courts suffers. The Supreme
Court creates the problem by changing doctrine and questioning its own
precedent; the lower court merely completes a rejection initiated by the
Supreme Court, a rejection that the Court would eventually make re-
gardless of what the lower court did.233 Public perception is enhanced if
the lower court candidly acknowledges its action rather than creating
dubious distinctions that might cause the public to doubt the competence
of the court. Blindly following a doubtful precedent may actually tarnish
the lower court's public image. The public probably associates Supreme
Court reversal of a lower court decision with incompetence-if the
229. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
230. Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62, 69 (E.D.S.C. 1948), rev'd,
336 U.S. 220 (1949).
231. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
232. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
233. This assumes that the lower courts are correct in most of the cases where they use
anticipatory overruling. When the lower courts incorrectly reject a precedent that the
Supreme Court does not reject, the resulting Supreme Court reversal damages the public
image of the courts.
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Supreme Court reverses, the lower court must not have done its job well.
Requiring a court to follow a questionable precedent increases the likeli-
hood of reversal by the Supreme Court as well as the likelihood that the
lower court will later have to overrule its own cases. Neither of these
possibilities engenders confidence in the courts.
5. Duty of Obedience to the Supreme Court
Disregarding a standing, but doubtful, Supreme Court precedent ar-
guably violates a lower court's duty of loyalty to the Supreme Court."
Our multi-tiered judicial system is premised on respect for, and alle-
giance to, higher court pronouncements; disregarding standing precedent
upsets that system. The duty of obedience to the Supreme Court focuses
not only on notions of judicial economy, but also on the unique leader-
ship role of the higher court. We entrust the Supreme Court with the
ultimate judicial decision-making power. Disregarding live Supreme
Court precedent would arguably be a blatant usurpation of that power.
A lower court clearly violates its duty of allegiance to the Supreme
Court when, simply because the lower court feels the earlier Supreme
Court decision was analytically wrong, it rejects a precedent that the
Supreme Court has not questioned. If a lower court has any duty to obey
the Supreme Court, a blatant rejection of unquestioned Supreme Court
doctrine violates that duty.235
The duty of the lower court is less clear when the Supreme Court has
questioned its own precedent. In such cases, there is more than one
Supreme Court decision to which the lower court owes obedience. The
older, doubtful precedent requires the lower court to rule one way, but a
newer case or series of Supreme Court cases argues for the opposite deci-
sion. To which line of decisions does the lower court owe obedience? If
the later Supreme Court decision expressly overrules the earlier case, un-
questionably the lower court should follow the latest pronouncement.
Rejection of the precedent that the Supreme Court has itself overruled is
not infidelity to the higher court. If this is true, should not the lower
court also follow the later case where the rejection is implicit rather than
explicit? If the goal is allegiance to the Supreme Court, it is sophistry to
require the lower court to follow doctrine that the Court has rejected,
simply because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the particular issue
confronting the lower court. How is fealty served when the lower court
is clearly convinced that its ruling is contrary to the choice the Supreme
Court itself would make? To disregard the current doctrine and apply
the discredited case is the greater violation of the duty of loyalty.
A problem, and one of the concerns that may have motivated the
Supreme Court in Rodriguez, is that a lower court might use anticipatory
234. See generally Kniffin, supra note 7, at 74-75 (noting argument that obedience to
the Supreme Court requires following even outmoded precedents).
235. See Justice Powell's denunciation of the lower court in Jaffree v. Board of School
Commissioners of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1315-16 (1983).
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overruling to reject a Supreme Court precedent that is not really doubtful
but merely disliked. This possibility supports limiting anticipatory over-
ruling to cases where the lower court is "clearly convinced" or "certain"
that the Supreme Court would not follow the rejected precedent, 236 but
does not justify an absolute rejection of anticipatory overruling.
Accepting a lower court's power to disregard Supreme Court prece-
dent in limited cases does not necessarily portend the general fall of stare
decisis, provided the anticipatory overruling power is exercised sparingly
and properly. Judge Posner's opinion in Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc.2 37 is particularly instructive. In Olson, the court of appeals
had to decide the validity of the so-called Enelow-Ettelson doctrine,
which held that an equitable stay of a suit at law is deemed a preliminary
injunction and is therefore appealable under 28 U.S.C. section
1292(a)(1). 238 Judge Posner pointed out that the pattern of later cases
was inconsistent with Enelow-Ettelson and that it had been conjectured
that the Supreme Court had implicitly rejected the doctrine. He noted
strong criticism of the doctrine and argued that it made no policy sense.
Judge Posner concluded that "[t]he case against the doctrine seems to us
conclusive. ' 239 He nevertheless followed the doctrine, because he was
unsure what the Supreme Court would do and felt rejection would be
inappropriate.2' Olson demonstrates that the willingness of a lower
court to disregard Supreme Court precedent under limited conditions
does not mean that it will always do so.
Those concerned about possible abuse are naive in assuming that lower
courts blindly follow Supreme Court precedent and are unable to avoid
precedent they dislike. Llewellyn's list of ways to avoid precedent 24' is as
applicable to a higher court's precedent as it is to a court's own prece-
dent. Maurice Kelman noted "the black art of specious distinction by
which lower courts sometimes evade authoritative precedent. ' 24 2 While
acceptance of anticipatory overruling would give lower courts an addi-
tional device to evade precedent they dislike, application of the doctrine
would at least expose what the lower court is really doing.
In any event, a lower court that abuses anticipatory overruling may
well be overruled or subjected to the other sanctions that circumscribe
lower courts. If a lower court oversteps its bounds and disregards a pre-
cedent that the Supreme Court will not overrule, "the same penalty re-
236. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
237. 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986).
238. See Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942), overruled, Gulf-
stream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988); Enelow v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935), overruled, Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
239. See Olson, 806 F.2d at 741.
240. See id. at 741-42.
241. See K. Llewellyn, supra note 166, at 84-87.
242. Kelman, supra note 5, at 26.
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mains as for any other wrong decision - reversal." '243 Courts are
entrusted with a variety of judgment calls. If they can be trusted to apply
precedent properly and faithfully and to interpret statutes and determine
their constitutionality, they can also be trusted to decide honestly
whether a Supreme Court precedent is so obviously injured that it should
be disregarded. 2"
Lower court disregard of doubtful precedent may conflict with one
particular Supreme Court policy choice: timing. The Court's docket is
largely discretionary; thus, the Court can control when it will overrule a
precedent. By rejecting a doubtful precedent that has not been expressly
overruled, the lower court usurps the Supreme Court's control over tim-
ing.24 5 If other courts also reject the precedent, the doctrine has been
changed before the Supreme Court would have done so. If other courts
continue to follow the old rule, the resulting conflict in the lower courts
may force the Supreme Court to act.2 In either case, the Supreme
Court's control of its discretionary docket is restricted.
This objection is valid only if the Supreme Court has made a policy
decision to delay reconsideration of the doubtful precedent. More likely,
the Court simply has not had an opportunity to overrule the doubtful
precedent. If the delay results from lack of opportunity and is not a
conscious timing decision, the Supreme Court should welcome the lower
court's decision to disregard the doubtful precedent. If the lower court's
disregard is followed by others, it frees the Supreme Court from having
to consider the issue. If the lower court's ruling is not followed, the re-
sulting conflict presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to ex-
pressly reject the precedent.
In any event, the timing argument misses the point. The Supreme
Court made its timing decision when it rejected the old doctrine. When
the Court cast doubt on its earlier precedent, it gave up whatever interest
it may have had in delaying doctrinal change. Finally, the legitimacy of
the timing argument is questionable. If the Supreme Court has an-
nounced in later cases that an earlier approach was wrong, what interest
does it have in forcing courts to continue to reach the wrong result?
And, if it has some interest in doing so, does that interest outweigh the
interest in a correct, just result in the individual case?
6. Speculation
One court has criticized lower court disregard of questionable prece-
243. Note, supra note 5, at 168.
244. See id. "If lower court judges can be relied on to weigh the evidence in deciding a
case, it would appear they can be trusted to weigh the evidence as to the strength of a
precedent." Id.
245. See Kniffin, supra note 7, at 86.
246. See Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 741 (7th Cir.
1986).
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dent as "a bold but unfruitful venture in speculation., 247 The argument
that courts are unqualified to engage in the prediction required for antici-
patory overruling fails, however, because the decisions involved in antici-
patory overruling are not qualitatively different from many other types of
decisions lower courts must make. Courts regularly analyze holdings
and make predictions. The idea that a lower court exercises no judgment
in following precedent is simply wrong. Determining whether the
Supreme Court will overrule an existing precedent involves the same type
of prediction as determining whether to apply an existing precedent to a
new set of facts, or deciding how to rule when no precedent provides
guidance. "In this sense any decision ... [by a court] involves a 'venture
in speculation.' "248 Interpretation is the business of courts. "No more
than when courts generally are interpreting a statute should lower courts
in interpreting Supreme Court decisions insist on excessive explicitness,
saying, 'We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and
therefore we shall go on as before.' "249
Determining whether a particular case is direct precedent involves
characterization-to what extent are the facts of this case and the facts of
the prior one similar?25 ° This characterization process is absent only in a
trivial number of cases. Consider a court of appeals faced with two
Supreme Court precedents. Precedent X, an older case, favors the plain-
tiff. Precedent Y is a more recent case whose approach favors the defend-
ant. Language in precedent X is inconsistent with the approach in
precedent Y. All three cases, including the case now before the court, fall
within the general area of law represented by the large rectangle ABCD
in the following figure:
247. United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976).
248. Id. at 1372 (Bazelon, C.J., opinion in support of rehearing en banc).
249. Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 218 n.30 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd,
317 U.S. 607 (1943).
250. In Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990), Justice Brennan stated:
As every first-year law student learns, adjudication according to prevailing law
means far more than obeying precedent by perfunctorily applying holdings in
previous cases to virtually identical fact patterns. Rather, such adjudication
requires a judge to evaluate both the content of previously enunciated legal
rules and the breadth of their application. A judge must thereby discern
whether the principles applied to specific fact patterns in prior cases fairly ex-
tend to govern analogous factual patterns.
Id. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Schauer, supra note 201, at 577-88 (noting
the difficulty in determining when like cases are alike); Lyons, supra note 201, at 498-503
(same).
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Precedent X's facts place it within category 1, a subset of ABCD cases.
However, its holding might be read more broadly as covering all cases
falling within categories 1 and 2 or as covering all cases within categories
1 and 3. Read most broadly, its holding would apply to all ABCD cases.
Precedent Y's facts fall narrowly within category 4, but it also might be
read more broadly to cover all category 2 and 4 cases, or all category 3
and 4 cases, or even all cases within rectangle ABCD. Assume that the
case now before the lower court falls within category 2 or category 3.
Which precedent should the court follow-X or Y9 The answer depends
on how the holding of each case is categorized. A variety of results are
possible. If both X and Y are limited to their narrowest categorization,
the lower court has no direct precedent to follow. Depending on how the
lower court reads X and Y, it is possible that only precedent X applies, or
only precedent Y applies, or that precedent X applied but has now been
overruled by precedent Y. The possibility of overruling exists even if the
lower court's new case is a category 1 case, because precedent Y could
overrule precedent X if the court construes Y's holding as covering all
ABCD cases.251
This analysis places the securities arbitration cases in a different light.
In 1953, Wilko decided that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act
claims were unenforceable. McMahon held that pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate 1934 Act claims were enforceable.25 2 But should McMahon's
reasoning be limited to the 1934 Act category, or should it be seen more
broadly as covering all federal securities claims, given the similarity and
251. Professor Kniffin tries to distinguish implied overruling-where the Supreme
Court overturns its previous decision without mentioning it-from anticipatory overrul-
ing-where the Supreme Court's change of doctrine has arisen in another area and does
not repudiate the previous decision either explicitly or by implication. See Kniffin, supra
note 7, at 57. This distinction is dubious, given what the text says about characterization.
A case that Kniffin sees as implied overruling can be treated as anticipatory overruling
simply by recharacterizing the two Supreme Court cases. If Professor Kniflin means to
imply a rigid distinction between the two categories, she is incorrect.
252. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
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interdependence of the two statutes? If McMahon is categorized broadly,
then McMahon would effectively overrule Wilko and Wilko should be
disregarded. If McMahon is characterized narrowly, then Wilko should
still be followed as to 1933 Act claims. Of course, the Supreme Court in
McMahon expressly reserved the Wilko question,253 but the general the-
ory of stare decisis has never treated such dictum as controlling.
The decision making involved in anticipatory overruling is not very
different from the characterization required to apply stare decisis. The
claim that anticipatory overruling involves some unique type of analysis
that courts are not equipped to handle is simply wrong.
VI. RESCUING RODRIGUEZ? A MORE LIMITED INTERPRETATION
The Rodriguez statements concerning anticipatory overruling can be
read broadly or narrowly. The broad reading is the most obvious one-
lower courts must follow Supreme Court decisions, however questiona-
ble, until the Supreme Court expressly overrules them. For the reasons
stated above, this position is unwarranted. A more limited reading
would confine the Court's statements regarding anticipatory overruling
to cases involving statutory interpretation. Courts generally, and the
Supreme Court in particular, have argued that prior interpretations of
statutes deserve greater deference than constitutional or common-law
precedents.254 The rationale is that a longstanding interpretation of a
statute effectively becomes a part of the legislation; if Congress is dissatis-
fied with the court's interpretation, Congress can legislatively change it.
This special deference to statutory precedent has been rather convinc-
ingly attacked in recent articles by Professor William Eskridge, Jr. and
Judge Frank Easterbrook.255 In any event, the Supreme Court has not
always lived by its own rhetoric. Professor Eskridge indicates that more
than eighty statutory precedents were overruled or materially modified
by the Supreme Court from 1961 to 1987.256 The McMahon case is one
example.257
Lower courts have occasionally used the legislative acquiescence argu-
ment as a reason for following Supreme Court interpretations of statutes,
even if later decisions made those interpretations questionable.258 If this
253. See id. at 234.
254. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1364-84; see also Note, supra note 167, at 370 (be-
cause Congress can change a statute if it disagrees with the Court's interpretation, the
Court should adhere to its previous construction of statutes until Congress changes it).
255. See Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev.
422, 426-433 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1392-1409. But see Marshall, "Let Con-
gress Do It'" The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
177 (1989) (arguing in favor of absolute rule of stare decisis for all statutory and federal
common-law decisions of the Supreme Court).
256. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1363, 1427-39.
257. See id. at 1435.
258. See Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 742 (7th Cir.
1986); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
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is what Rodriguez is saying, the argument is unconvincing. It is illogical
to say that the Supreme Court may modify a longstanding statutory in-
terpretation but that lower courts may not. Legislative inaction is an
equally strong argument against overruling in both cases. If legislative
inaction does not prevent the Supreme Court from overruling, this inac-
tion should not prevent the lower courts from anticipating that
overruling.
The statutory/nonstatutory distinction is relevant in anticipatory over-
ruling. A lower court must consider the Supreme Court's reluctance to
overrule statutory precedent when predicting what the Supreme Court
would do. In this sense, whether the prior Supreme Court case was an
interpretation of a statute should affect a lower court's willingness to
overrule because it affects the probability of Supreme Court action. A
lower court should not, however, refuse to engage in anticipatory over-
ruling merely because the precedent is an interpretation of statute. If the
lower court believes that the Supreme Court has effectively rejected the
precedent and would overrule it if given the chance, the lower court
should disregard the precedent, statutory or not. There should be no
absolute bar to anticipatory overruling merely because a precedent is
statutory. Wilko's status as an interpretation of statute gives no extra
support to the Rodriguez disapproval of anticipatory overruling.
VII. PLACING THE BLAME
The lower court decisions after McMahon 259 must be criticized for
failing to grasp fully the problem with which they were dealing. In their
haste to decide, these courts ignored scholarly commentary and a
number of prior federal cases explicitly dealing with the effect of doubtful
Supreme Court precedent. All of the opinions purporting to overrule
Wilko set aside this Supreme Court precedent with little discussion of
their authority to do so. All but one26" of the opinions following Wilko
did so blindly, as if the body of comment and case law allowing anticipa-
tory overruling did not exist. Done properly, anticipatory overruling re-
quires careful examination of Supreme Court precedent and the
likelihood of eventual overruling. It is not something to stumble into
blindly. Neither set of opinions gave due weight to the relevant Supreme
Court decisions. The cases rejecting Wilko ignored its effect as binding
precedent. The cases following Wilko ignored the effect of McMahon.
Most of the blame for the lower courts' problems after McMahon,
however, must be laid on the shoulders of the McMahon majority. Mc-
Mahon's refusal to recognize the clear parallels between the relevant
1933 Act and 1934 Act provisions is disingenuous. The majority's rea-
259. See supra cases cited in notes 111-112.
260. Araim v. Painewebber, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1415, 1417-18 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Judge
Forrester deserves special commendation for attempting to deal with the jurisprudential
problem that his brethren ignored.
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soning in McMahon provided two options: (1) directly overrule Wilko or
(2) adopt the "colorable argument" as the basis for allowing arbitration
of 1934 Act claims. The McMahon majority did not exercise either
option.
By refusing to broaden its McMahon ruling and directly overrule
Wilko, the Supreme Court ignored its unique position in our judicial sys-
tem. The United States Supreme Court is not an ordinary court that
must narrowly limit its holding to the facts at hand. The Supreme Court
oversees approximately 156 Court of Appeals judges in twelve circuits
and 544 District Court judges spread among 94 judicial districts. 261 The
Court must be concerned with the efficient administration of that un-
wieldy bureaucracy. Changing the law through a series of narrow, fact-
specific opinions-chipping away at the boulder of precedent one flake at
a time-leads to confusion and inefficiency within that bureaucracy. The
Court should announce policy changes as they occur and not in a piece-
meal fashion over the span of several years. Overruling a longstanding
precedent like Wilko is a difficult decision, but that decision should be
made honestly and straightforwardly, not stealthily as in McMahon.262
The Supreme Court should not decide cases that are not before it, but
it is foolish to ignore when a decision under one statutory provision effec-
tively resolves the same question under another, essentially identical pro-
vision. The Supreme Court was effectively overruling Wilko and it knew
it was effectively overruling Wilko. The Court's refusal to do so outright,
or at least to offer a clear signal as to its direction, was a disservice to the
federal judiciary and imposed a substantial cost on private litigants and
the lower courts.26 3
In light of the Supreme Court's action in McMahon, the Rodriguez
Court's criticism of the lower courts is misdirected. The Rodriguez ma-
jority blames the victim. If the Supreme Court continues to act less than
forthrightly in dealing with precedent it dislikes, lower courts must be
free to use the doctrine of anticipatory overruling to reach the right
result.
261. See The Lawyer's Almanac 714 (1990). These figures are as of June 30, 1988.
262. Professor Fletcher sees the majority opinion in McMahon as an inability to come
to grips with "the great conservative paradox of the newly conservative Court"-what
does one do with a case that is no longer viable but has represented well-settled law for
many years? See Fletcher, supra note 91, at 114. He sees McMahon as intentionally
sending a mixed signal in order to avoid having to come to grips with this problem.
"That mixed signal indicates that although the Court was willing to disparage Wilko as
without foundation under contemporary circumstances, it was unwilling to give a hint as
to how it might decide that case were it presented to the Court today." Id.
263. It is possible that there was not a majority in McMahon willing to overrule Wilko,
but this is hard to believe. It is hard to see how any member of the McMahon majority
could really have believed that Wilko was preserved. The dissent certainly recognized
Wilko's death. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It did not take the majority long to recognize it as
well. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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